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ABSTRACT 
 
Banking in South Africa, like in any other country, is one of those industries that carries huge risk, and 
every effort by the stakeholders is important to minimise the risk. The intervention of government in 
the banking industry is very important to establish a smooth and trusted banking industry. More 
importantly, the cooperation of all financial institutions in striving for a risk free banking industry 
cannot be over-emphasized. It is within these parameters that certain duties and obligations are 
imposed upon banks to identify and verify their customers in order to comply with various statutes of 
the Republic.   
 
In South Africa, the enactment of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act1 (FICA) was a major milestone 
in combating financial crimes committed through the banks and financial institutions.  These crimes 
include, but are not limited to, money laundering, corruption and the financing of terrorism. The Know-
Your-Client (KYC) requirement of FICA is essentially the main focus of this dissertation. It places a 
strong obligation on banks to conduct a proper identification and verification process. In this regard 
attention is also devoted to the fact that FICA (and other South African legislation aimed at combating 
financial crime), is not a sole national endeavour but flows from international financial-crime fighting 
initiatives. As part of the international banking world, South Africa is duty bound to implement and 
apply international practices in this regard. Hence, the role of a number of international bodies is also 
considered in this dissertation.   
 
The study commences, however, with the development of the duty on banks to identify and verify 
customers and prospective customers in South African common law – a duty that has arisen in the 
context of the potential delictual liability of banks who fail to identify and verify their clients. This study 
shows that there is much similarity in the content of the common-law and statutory duties on banks 
concerning KYC.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 38 of 2001. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
1.1 Research introduction. 
The Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) is an organ of state2 established in terms of section 2 of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act3 (FICA).  The objectives and aims of the FIC are to assist in 
identifying the proceeds of unlawful activities, combating money laundering, the financing of terrorism 
and related activities.4  The role of the FIC as an organ of state is not to conduct law enforcement 
activities or prosecute wrongdoers but to collect financial data and intelligence and analyse it for the 
benefit of law enforcement and investigative agencies by disseminating the analysed information to 
the relevant law enforcement agency.5 
The FIC was established in February 20026 as South Africa’s national regulatory body 
operating as a centre for the gathering and analysis of financial data. It reports to the Minister of 
Finance and to Parliament through the Portfolio Committee on Finance.7 Its primary role is to 
contribute to safeguarding the integrity of South Africa’s financial system and its institutions, and to 
make them intolerant to abuse.8 
To a certain extent in South Africa, the financing of terrorism and related activities are not 
considered as prevalent as money laundering. Therefore, FICA focuses strongly on imposing 
obligations on accountable and reporting institutions to employ ways to combat money laundering and 
to develop anti-money laundering strategies. Money laundering is a process by which money or 
property is manipulated in order to disguise its true source.9 
The purpose of this dissertation is to unpack the obligation on banks to identify and verify 
customers in accordance with both the common law and statutory law.10 The focus will be on how 
“know your client” (KYC) and/or “customer due diligence” (CDD) as required by common law, FICA 
and certain rules of international bodies are applied by banks in South Africa. The dissertation will 
also investigate the extent to which banks are compliant and consider the consequences of non-
compliance with the duties and obligations concerned. The phrases “know-your-client” and “customer 
due diligence” convey the same idea and will be used interchangeably in this dissertation.  
                                                          
2 S 239 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa , 1996, defines “organ of state” as, inter alia, “any other 
functionary or institution exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation”.  
3  n 1 above.  
4 s 3 of FICA. 
5 Hugo and Spruyt “Money laundering, terrorist financing and financial sanctions: South Africa’s response by means of 
the Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act 1 of 2017” 2018 TSAR 227 227. 
6 FIC Annual Report (2003-2004) 3 available at https://www.fic.gov.za/Documents/FIC%20Annual%20Report%202003-
2004.pdf (20-09-2019). 
7 FIC Annual Report (2018-2019) 2 available at https://www.fic.gov.za/Documents/FIC%20Annual%20Report%202018-
2019.pdf (20-09-2019). 
8 Preamble of FICA. 
9 FIC Guidance Note 7 on the Implementation of Various Aspects of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 (Act 38 
of 2001), https://www.fic.gov.za/Documents/171002_FIC%20Guidance%20Note%2007.pdf (27-08-2019) par 5. 
10 s 21 of FICA. 
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The study will also look at how the banking industry applies customer due diligence and what 
the legal framework is that the banking industry uses in dealing with customer due diligence.  
This is followed by a brief consideration of banking regulation in this respect from an 
international viewpoint, and of how banks in South Africa have become part of the international 
banking environment. The focus will fall on the obligations conferred upon banks in South Africa by 
international banking regulators with regard to the identification and verification of customers. 
The study will also look at how the FIC collects and analyses information from accountable 
institutions and how that information is managed and distributed to the relevant law-enforcement and 
investigative agencies upon request. 
This dissertation will consider the common law duties and obligations of banks in South Africa 
when opening an account for a customer. It will also analyse the statutory requirements, as imposed 
by FICA,11 relating to KYC/CDD, and how banks should always maintain continuous compliance with 
the requirement.  The analysis will incorporate a discussion of the compliance levels required from 
South African banks by local and international banking bodies and regulators. The potential liability of 
banks in South Africa arising from non-compliance with the requirements of FICA will also be 
investigated briefly. 
 
1.2. Scope and structure. 
The scope of this dissertation is limited to the identification and verification of customers by banks as 
envisaged in section 21 of FICA. It must be noted that while FICA covers many aspects relating to 
money laundering and terror financing, the purpose of this dissertation is to focus on how banks 
identify and verify their customers and conduct risk assessment, as well as on how international 
regulators influence the approach adopted by South Africa in dealing with issues of risk assessment, 
identification and verification of customers. 
Paragraph One contains the introduction and sets the scene and scope of the dissertation. 
Paragraph Two deals with the development of the common law regarding the obligations on banks in 
relation to the identification and verification of customers’ identity. Relevant case law is considered in 
this regard. Paragraph Three focuses on banks and their relationship with their customers, and how 
they apply customer due diligence in accordance with FICA. Paragraph Three further deals with the 
duties and obligations of banks as required by international banking regulators in applying the risk -
based approach to the bank-customer relationships. Paragraph Four summarises the study and 
concludes by formulating recommendations on how banks in South Africa can ensure that they fulfil 
their statutory and common law obligations in the CIV context.  
 
 
 
                                                          
11 n 1 above. 
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2.  Common law duties and responsibilities of banks. 
 
2.1 Introduction.  
An obligation on banks to verify the identity of the customers was recognised and developed in a 
series of South African cases well before the enactment of FICA. The main context of this legal 
development has been the duty of a bank to safeguard the true owners of lost or stolen cheques from 
fraud and other common law crimes.12 Such fraud typically requires of the fraudster to have a bank 
account, and, to prevent detection, the fraudster uses a false bank account. The fraud is preventable 
by proper identification and verification of prospective clients. It is clear that if the bank fails to identify 
a client properly, resulting to financial loss by someone, this may lead to the bank being delictually 
liable for that loss. The most prominent context (but not the only one) in which the law in this regard 
has developed is in the recognition of a legal duty on a collecting bank towards the true owner of a 
cheque not to collect payment for a thief.13 The relevant case law in this regard, will be explored 
below. 
 
2.2. The common law prior to the Indac Electronics case (the Yorkshire Insurance era). 
The recognition in the South African law of the delictual liability of a collecting bank to the true owner 
of a stolen cheque was a controversial milestone.14  The Yorkshire Insurance case15 is one of those 
cases that ruled that the bank, acting in good faith, is not liable to the true owner of a stolen cheque.   
The facts of the case briefly stated were as follows.  There was one Harris, who was a trustee 
in various insolvent estates and a liquidator in some insolvent companies.  He opened a bank account 
in the name of the estates with Barclays Bank and he held his personal bank account at Standard 
Bank.  He stole 19 cheques from the estates and presented them for payment at Standard Bank 
depositing them in his personal account.  He further stole another 45 cheques and deposited them at 
Standard Bank.   
Yorkshire Insurance Company, an insurer for the estates, paid the claim for the loss of 
cheques and sued Barclays Bank, as a drawee bank, for delict under lex Aquilia.16  Yorkshire 
Insurance Company alleged that Barclays Bank had knowledge of the breach of trust by Harris.  In 
deciding the case on exception, Greenberg J upheld an objection to the plaintiff's main cause of 
action and dismissed the exception against the alternative cause of action. In his judgment, 
Greenberg J said that if it could be established that Barclays Bank acted with full knowledge of 
                                                          
12 Neethling, Potgieter and Scott Casebook on the Law of Delict (2013), 745. 
13 Malan, Pretorius and du Toit Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes (2009) par 281. 
14 Malan, Pretorius and Du Toit (n 13) par 281. 
15 Yorkshire Insurance Company v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd  1928 WLD 251. 
16 Yorkshire Insurance Company v Barclays Bank of South Africa Ltd 1928 WLD 199. 
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Harris's breach of trust, it would be liable in delict under the lex Aquilia.17  In arriving to his judgment, 
Greenberg J based his judgment on the basis of the decision in Matthews v Young.18   
Yorkshire Insurance Company thereafter brought a second action under the lex Aquilia, this 
time against the Standard Bank19 as the collecting banker in respect of all the cheques.  It was 
alleged that Standard Bank knew Harris was misappropriating trust funds, alternatively, the Bank 
acted negligently and in breach of a duty of care to enquire whether Harris was entitled to the 
proceeds of the cheques received by him from the estates and whether he had authority to draw the 
cheques which he drew on the estates in his own favour.  In deciding the matter, Tindall J held, with 
regard to the main cause of action, that it had not been established that Standard Bank had 
knowledge of Harris misappropriating trust funds, and with regard to the alternative cause of action 
based on negligence, that in our law a bank collecting payment of a cheque, whether crossed or not, 
on behalf of a customer who has no title thereto, is not liable to the true owner for any loss sustained 
by him on the ground of negligence at common law.20   
Tindall J thus compared the position of a collecting banker, dealing in good faith with a stolen 
cheque, with that of an ordinary bona fide purchaser of movable property who innocently bought 
stolen property and then parted with it innocently and confirmed that in that case you cannot invoke 
the lex Aquilia action on grounds of negligence.  Professor D V Cowen in his L C Steyn Memorial 
Lecture supported this view of Tindall J.21 
 
 In South African law, the recognition of the delictual liability of the collecting bank to the true 
owner of a lost or stolen cheque was subject to controversy and opposing debates.22  Most writers, 
inter alia Malan and Pretorius,23 favoured the recognition of a duty of care on a collecting bank to 
avoid causing loss to the true owner of a lost or stolen cheque by negligently dealing with it.  Cowen, 
however, took the opposite view.24  The topic was seriously debated by our courts.25 
 
 The Atkinson Oates Motors Ltd v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd26 was the next decision on the 
collecting banker's liability for negligence, where Franklin J endorsed the finding in the Yorkshire 
Insurance case. 
                                                          
17 at 206-207. 
18 Matthews v Young 1922 AD 492. 
19 (n 15). 
20 (n 15) 280-283. 
21 Cowen "The liability of a bank in the computer age in respect of a stolen cheque" 1981 TSAR 193 202-206. 
22 (n 13). 
23 Malan “Professional responsibility and the payment and collection of cheque” 1979 De Jure 31.  
24 Cowen (n 21) 202-206. 
25 Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd. v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 (1) SA 783 (AD). 
26 1977 3 SA 188 (W). 
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The landmark decision of Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Beperk27 was the first 
in which delictual liability for pure economic loss under the extended lex Aquilia was clearly 
recognised.   This case laid the foundation for the imposition of liability on a collecting bank.  
 
2.3 The Indac Electronics case. 
Subsequently, in the case of Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd,28 the court recognised 
that a collecting bank may, in principle, be held liable under the extended lex Aquilia for negligence to 
the true owner of a cheque, provided that all elements required for an Aquilian action are present. In 
this matter, the AD had to decide on the question whether a collecting banker, who negligently 
collects payment of a cheque on behalf of a customer who has no title thereto, could be held liable 
under the lex Aquilia for pure economic loss sustained by the true owner of the cheque who is not its 
customer.  
The facts in this matter turned on a cheque which was drawn by the defendant’s Silverton 
branch in the sum of R 58 218 in favour of the plaintiff, Indac Electronics. The cheque was crossed 
and marked “not negotiable”. The defendant collected payment on this unendorsed cheque for a Mr J 
le Roux. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant owed it a duty of care and that it ought to have been 
aware that Mr J le Roux was not entitled to the cheque and that it was duty bound to deal with the 
cheque in such a way that it did not cause economic loss to the plaintiff.  
In the Appellate Division, Vivier JA held that in order to be successful in an Aquilian claim, the 
true owner of the cheque must prove the following:- 
(i) that the collecting bank received payment of the cheque on behalf of someone who 
was not entitled thereto; 
(ii) that in so doing the collecting bank acted 
(a) negligently, and 
(b) unlawfully; 
(iii) that the conduct of the collecting bank caused the true owner of the cheque to sustain 
loss; and 
(iv) that the damages claimed represent proper compensation for such loss.29 
 
In deciding the matter, Vivier JA consulted a number of authorities, both local and in other 
jurisdictions, which dealt with the duty of care and finally held that the defence of indeterminate 
liability that was raised was not persuasive because the extent of the loss is determinable from the 
face value of the cheque.30  The court further held that there is a huge risk of payments being made to 
                                                          
27 1979 3 SA 824 (A). 
28  (n 25). 
29 797 C–E. 
30 798 D–E. 
  
© University of Johannesburg 
 
a wrong person and the banks have a duty to protect the true owner of the cheque from such 
eventuality.31 
The court recognised that the banking industry deals with countless cheques being collected 
and therefore banks needed to protect the owners of such cheques: - 
“If there were no legal duty to take reasonable care, it would mean that the collecting banker need not 
examine or even look at the cheque to ascertain to whom it is payable. The crossing of cheque would 
be of little consequence if no legal duty existed on the part of the collecting banker. 32… 
 
…The collecting banker, however, remains the only person who is in a position to know whether or not 
a cheque is being collected on behalf of a person who is entitled to receive payment, and the drawee 
bank has to rely on the collecting banker to ascertain this fact…  
 
…The drawer or true owner of a cheque is unable to take any steps to protec t himself from the loss he 
will suffer if the collecting banker negligently collects payment on behalf of a person who is not entitled 
thereto.”33 
 
The court, having consulted a number of authorities in order to reach its decision held as follows: - 
“There can now be no reason in principle why a collecting bank should not be held liable under the 
extended lex Aquilia for negligence to the true owner of a cheque, provided all the elements or 
requirements of Aquilian liability have been met”.34   
 
The defendant, having excepted to the particulars of claim by the plaintiff on the ground that there 
was no legal duty on the part of the bank to the true owner of the cheque, contested that its conduct 
and actions were not unlawful.  The court, in applying a value judgment, held that the conduct was 
unlawful and therefore concluded that the lex Aquilia may potentially provide a remedy to the true 
owner of the lost or stolen cheque where the bank negligently collects payment of the cheque. 35 
 
2.4 The KwaMashu Bakery case. 
Although the Indac case had nothing to do with customer identification and verification, it paved the 
way for the establishment of obligations on banks to identify their customers.  The case in point in this 
regard, was KwaMashu Bakery Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd.36  The KwaMashu case is 
also significant because it is the first case where a collecting bank took up the challenge to present 
evidence that the duty sought to be imposed was too burdensome.37  
The facts were simple. The drawer, OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd, drew two cheques for R 14 219,45 
and R18 176,23 respectively, totalling R 32 395,68, on Standard Bank’s Eloff Street branch in favour 
of the plaintiff, KwaMashu Bakery Ltd. Both cheques were marked in bold across the middle and 
running vertically upwards with the words "not transferable". It appears that the two cheques were 
                                                          
31 798I-799A. 
32 799D. 
33 799F-H. 
34 797A. 
35  801A. 
36 1995 1 SA 783 (A). 
37 Malan, Pretorius & Du Toit (n 13) par 285. 
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stolen from the plaintiff who described itself as the payee and true owner of the cheques. 38 The 
thieves subsequently opened an account with the defendant's Durban branch under the name of 
"KwaMashu Bakery Ltd Soccer Club" and deposited the stolen cheques for collection into this 
account. Regarding the first cheque, the name of the account holder on the deposit slip was stated as 
"KwaMashu Bakery Ltd Soccer Club" while in the case of the second cheque the account holder was 
simply described as "KwaMashu bakery". Both cheques were duly collected by defendant's Durban 
branch for the credit of the "fake" account and the OK Bazaars bank account in Eloff Street branch 
was debited with the amount of R 32 395, 68.  
The plaintiff in this matter did not lead evidence and the defendant called one witness, a 
banking expert. After evaluating the evidence led by the defendant, the court dealt with the steps the 
bank ought to have taken in order to discharge the duty of care.39 The court argued that in order for 
banks to discharge this duty, they must take certain reasonable, practical and affordable steps in 
order to prevent loss of a cheque to the true owner. In this matter the thieves opened accounts with 
names that were similar to those of the plaintiff. Combrink J held that it is reasonable to expect of the 
bank not only to satisfy itself as to the identity of the new client, but also to gather sufficient 
information regarding such client to establish whether that person is the entity which she/he/it 
purports to be, in a nutshell, to conduct proper due diligence.40 In summary, the court called for the 
bank to adopt an identification and verification approach to avert the commission of fraud.  In 
essence, the court expressed the need for banks to take further steps in verifying the information 
provided by their prospective customers, to ensure that the information given is correct, before 
transacting with them. The court made it crystal clear that due diligence must be conducted and 
completed before the bank accepts anyone as a customer. Requiring the banks to identify and verify 
the identity of a customer does not cast an unduly burdensome duty on banks and banks need to 
accept this obligation.41 
The court emphasized that the fraud in this matter could have been uncovered at an early 
stage if the bank had conducted a proper due diligence. The bank, in accordance with standard 
banking practice, ought to have taken reasonable steps to ascertain the identity of the customer and 
further to have verified whether the information supplied by the customer was correct. 42 In opening 
the KwaMashu Bakery Soccer Ltd bank account, the bank failed to request proper substantiating 
documentation such as the constitution of the club, the memorandum of association, names and 
addresses of office bearers and resolutions to open a bank account. In conclusion, the court held that 
the bank failed to take precautionary measures to identify and verify the identity of the thieves and 
that this caused the plaintiff to sustain loss which it was entitled to recover from the bank.  The court 
                                                          
38 380H. 
39 395H. 
40 396. 
41  394. 
42 Malan, Pretorius & Du Toit (n 13) par 287. 
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found that the defendant had received payments on behalf of persons who had no entitlement 
thereto, and that in so doing it had acted negligently by collecting cheques which were made out to a 
limited liability company into the account of individuals or an association of individuals. 43  The 
KwaMashu judgment is very important in that, for the first time, a South African court laid down  some 
clear requirements for a KYC programme. 
 
2.5 Further developments relating to the duty to identify and verify clients in case law . 
Another matter of interest in this context is the case of Commissioner of South African Revenue 
Services v ABSA Bank Limited,44 as it was the first instance in which a South African court suggested 
that there may be a duty on collecting banks to monitor the banking activities of their customers. 
Briefly, the background of the case is that the plaintiff was defrauded of large sums of money in VAT 
refunds by Zamzar Trading (Pty) Ltd, a customer of the second defendant, ABSA Bank. The plaintiff 
sued the defendants to recover the amounts paid to Zamzar alleging that ABSA was negligent in 
opening the bank account for Zamzar by not conducting proper due diligence on the customer’s 
directors. Secondly, ABSA failed in its duty to query the source of debits and credits when large sums 
of money were paid into the account.45 Van der Nest AJ found that there are policy considerations 
supporting the existence of a legal duty on the part of the bank to avoid causing the plaintiff’s 
economic loss by negligently opening and maintaining the bank account of Zamzar. 46 However, the 
court did not finally decide the issue since the case before it was on exception. The court further 
indicated that such a ruling would place a significant burden on banks to monitor the activities of the 
bank accounts of their customers. 
 A further relevant case in this context is Powell v ABSA Bank Ltd t /a Volkskas Bank.47 In this 
matter, the court was asked to rule on a case of fraud relating to an employee opening a bank 
account in the name of the employer. The plaintiff was a second-hand car dealer who sought to 
source second-hand vehicles from Volkswagen, but could not because Volkswagen had a deal with 
another party for the selling of used vehicles. In trying to cut corners, the plaintiff approached an 
employee of Volkswagen who promised the plaintiff that he would sell him used vehicles. The plaintiff 
drew four cheques and gave them to the said employee of Volkswagen. The employee went to the 
defendant bank and opened a savings account in the name of his employer, and deposited the four 
cheques into this account. The defendant testified that it had conducted a verification exercise of the 
applicant by checking the telephone directory to ascertain whether there were similar names and by 
establishing with the credit bureaux whether there was any adverse information against the name of 
                                                          
43 397 F-I. 
44 2003 2 SA 96 (W). 
45 106. 
46 124. 
47 1998 2 SA 807 (SE). 
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the proposed customer.48 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in opening an account 
for the employee under the same name as his employer and further that:  
(i)  The bank simply accepted the employee's word for the fact that he was the owner of a 
business known as Volkswagen Used Vehicle Sales. The bank failed to carry out any 
independent enquiry or investigation apart from establishing that no existing business with that 
name was listed in the telephone directory; 
(ii)  It was obvious from the application to open the account that the employee had no business 
address and that he was apparently carrying on business from his home; 
(iii)  It should have been apparent to the bank that a motor dealer required a cheque account to 
enable him to carry on business and that the 'Maxi Save' account which the employee had 
opened was wholly inappropriate for this type of trade; and 
(iv)  The name 'Volkswagen' is a well-known trade name or business name and it was unlikely that 
the employee would have had the right to use that name for his own business.49 
 
In deciding the matter, the court consulted various authorities, and one of the cases which 
stood out was that of Rhostar (Pty) Ltd v Netherlands Bank of Rhodesia Ltd,50 where the court 
decided that the collecting bank is in a position capable of ascertaining whether or not the cheque is 
being collected on behalf of the person who is entitled to receive payment. As such, the court held 
that the bank failed to conduct proper due diligence on Volkswagen Used Vehicle Sales before 
opening a bank account. The court further distinguished the case before it from the case of 
KwaMashu, as the bank in KwaMashu dealt with a total stranger, whereas in the matter before the 
court, the bank knew the employee as its customer.51  
 Occasionally banks are confronted with customers who come as agents or in representative 
capacity in order to make it difficult for banks to uncover their fraud.  The law in this regard was 
refined in Columbus Joint Venture v Absa Bank Ltd.52 In this case a Mr Bertolis opened a new bank 
account with the defendant, ABSA Bank, not in his name but in the name of Stanbrooke and Hooper. 
When doing so he presented to the bank a well-prepared franchise contract between himself and 
Stanbrooke & Hopper, a firm of solicitors in Belgium. The “franchise agreement” required that the 
franchise operate a bank account in the name of Stanbrooke and Hooper.   
At the time of opening the account under the name of Stanbrooke and Hooper, Mr Bertolis had 
an account with the defendant, providing the bank with authentic documents.  It later became known 
that the franchise agreement was all fraud and on the face of it, there was nothing suspicious in 
relation to the franchise agreement, and, as a result, 39 cheques were deposited into this new 
                                                          
48 814H. 
49 817H-J and 818A-D. 
50  715-716. 
51  820F-I. 
52 2002 1 SA 90 (A). 
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account for collection.53 The appellant suffered loss through this fraud and intended to recover from 
the defendant bank.  The appellant alleged that the bank had been negligent in that:- 
 
(a) It had failed to establish whether the franchise agreement had been authentic and the 
information it contained correct. 
(b) It failed to satisfy itself that Stanbrooke and Hooper existed and had authorised Mr Bertolis 
to open and control an account in the name of Stanbrooke and Hooper and appellant 
alleged that the bank could have easily obtained the Stanbrooke and Hooper telephone 
numbers from the international directory and a call would have prevented the fraud 
committed by Mr Bertolis.  
 
Malan J in the court a quo54 held that:- 
 Mr Bertolis furnished the bank with authentic documents and had disclosed that he was an 
existing customer and the bank had no reason to doubt the documents authenticity. 55  
 The issue was whether it has been shown that the circumstances had been such as to have 
caused a reasonable and prudent banker to have suspicion about its customer’s bona fides.56   
 The fact that the banker failed to call Stanbrooke and Hooper did not in itself translate into 
breach of a duty to do so.57 
 It is the duty of the banker to take reasonable steps verify its customer and scrutinise with 
caution all documents submitted by the customer in substantiation of who he, she or it is.  The 
court further held that the duty of the banker to act as amateur detective was too burdensome 
and high and its imposition on the banker is not justifiable.58  
 The use of another name except that of the customer might be used for fraud and thus calls 
for explanation  and if explanations calls for an enquiry the banker should conduct that enquiry 
although there might be fear of offending the customer by probing too much. 59 
 Since Mr Bertolis was a verified existing customer and armed with franchise agreement, there 
was no further requirement on the part of the banker to conduct further investigation and 
therefore there was no basis to conclude that the banker failed in its duty it owed to the 
appellant.60 
 
                                                          
53 These cheques were for legal services, which were never rendered. 
54 Columbus Joint Venture v Absa Bank Ltd 2000 (3) SA 491 (W). 
55 98F-G. 
56 99C-D. 
57 100B-C. 
58 100D-F. 
59 102E-F. 
60 102G-H. 
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Cameron JA who delivered the judgment, which was in line with current banking practice, 
confirmed the decision of the court a quo on appeal in the Supreme Court of Appeal.  Cameron JA 
emphasized that the approach to an existing client is very different to that when opening an account 
for a stranger.61 
 Under the common law, banks are required to conduct CDD on customers who have no 
banking history. The decision by the court in the matter of Energy Measurements Pty Ltd v First 
National Bank of South Africa Ltd62 paved the way for a better approach to customer identification that 
is now also contained in section 21 of FICA. In this case, the court had to rule on a matter in which a 
customer fraudulently opened a bank account with the defendant despite having no banking history or 
credit worthiness.  The facts were that a certain Wayne approached the defendant to open a bank 
account.  The bank account was to be opened for “Tradefast 8, trading as Energy Measurements”, a 
company of which he was the sole director, shareholder and signatory.  Wayne provided all original 
documents needed to open a bank account and included an income projection statement as 
supporting document.  The bank official asked Wayne about his lack of banking history and he 
explained that he had been in the United States of America, and for this reason did not have a 
banking history in South Africa.  The bank official conducted a credit check on both Wayne and the 
company and found nothing negative except that it revealed that Wayne had been in South Africa 
during the time he claimed to have been in the United States.63 
The account was opened by the bank and fraudulently utilised. Evidence was led to the effect 
that the defendant bank had a standing policy of conducting due diligence on anyone opening a bank 
account. The plaintiff then led evidence relating to the approach of Standard Bank to the effect that its 
bank officials are sensitized to be vigilant of the use of trade names when opening a bank account 
and to conduct a strict due diligence in such cases. He further told the court that the competition 
between banks to open bank accounts does not absolve them from conducting proper identification 
and verification of potential customers. 
The court held that although the bank’s business is to open as many bank accounts as 
possible, the bank is at liberty to decide whether to open a bank account or not at its own pace. 64 In 
reaching the decision, the court commented that the duty of care resting on a bank regarding opening 
of an account for an existing customer is not as stringent as the duty imposed on a bank when 
opening an account for an unknown person.65 The court further held that the explanation of lack of 
credit history by Wayne should have been verified by the defendant and held that the banking official 
erred in closing her eyes on this matter. 
                                                          
61 The difference was discussed in the matters of Powell (n 47) and Columbus Joint Venture (n 52) cases. 
62 2001 3 SA 132 (W). 
63  152C-D. 
64  160C-D. 
65 (n 61). 
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The decision of the court a quo in Energy Measurements was upheld and confirmed on appeal 
by Hefer ACJ when he declined to lay down general guidelines, but quoted with approval the t rial 
court’s statement that when opening a new account “the very least that is required of a bank is to 
properly consider all the documentation that is placed before it and to apply their minds thereto”.  66  
This was also said in the Columbus case.67 
In conclusion, the court ruled that the defendant failed to conduct CDD thoroughly bearing in 
mind the risk element arising from the explanation and documents supplied by Wayne, and the 
absence of a banking history. 
 
2.6 Conclusion. 
The cases discussed above show that there is a need for banks to have measures in place to identify 
and verify the identity of potential customers. This was first recognised in principle by the Appellate 
Division in the case of Indac Electronics,68 was reinforced by KwaMashu Bakery Limited,69 and further 
refined in the subsequent cases of Powell,70 Columbus Joint Ventures71  and Energy Measurements.72 
The refinements show that banks should be especially cautious when accounts are opened in trading 
names, or by a person unknown to the bank, especially also if he/she fails to provide evidence of a 
banking history. 
Although these cases deal essentially with banks accepting deposited cheques, the principles 
developed in those cases may be capable of wider application. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
66Malan, Pretorius & Du Toit (n 13) par 290 408.  
67 (n 52) 97-98. 
68 (n 25). 
69 (n 36). 
70 (n 47). 
71 (n 52). 
72 2001 3 SA 132 (W). 
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3. LEGISLATION DEALING WITH IDENTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION OF CUSTOMERS BY               
BANKS. 
 
3.1 Global regulatory framework. 
 
3.1.1 Introduction. 
A successful money laundering control system consists of a collaborative effort domestically, 
regionally and internationally.73  There is an international obligation and expectation on banks to 
conduct themselves and their business of deposit taking in a synchronised way with international 
standards.  Banks are required to uphold international standards of identifying and verif ying the 
identities of their customers.74  
Money laundering is a global problem, which has been furthered by the development of trade 
between countries. The South African banking industry operates in an international field where 
banking is highly regulated. South Africa is a member of international banking associations and has 
adopted policies regarding banking that are used worldwide. The uniform standards and obligations 
imposed by these bodies are that all banks must know their customers before conducting any 
business with them.75  These are known as KYC standards.  The KYC standard forms the cornerstone 
of global anti-money laundering efforts because it require of banks that they obtain sufficient 
information about their customers and use it effectively.76   
Various international bodies, such as the Financial Action Task Force77 and the Basil 
Committee on Banking Services,78 are the innovators of the current KYC and CDD policies at 
international level.  These policies and standards are not binding on members but the organisations 
put pressure on member states to adopt them and ratify them into legislation in their respective 
countries.79 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse and understand the international standards drafted 
by these and other international bodies and how these standards are ratified into the law in our 
country.  The focus will be on KYC and CDD regimes. 
 
 
 
                                                          
73 Tuba Electronic Methods of Payment and Money Laundering: Exploring the Difficulties Experienced by Banks LLM 
Thesis University of South Africa (2013) 10. 
74 De Koker “Money laundering control and suppression of financing of terrorism” 2006 (13) Journal of Financial Crime 
26-50. 
75 De Koker (n 74) 26-27. 
76 Van Jaarsveld Aspects of Money Laundering in South Africa (2011) 208. 
77 Hereinafter the FATF. 
78 Hereinafter the Basel Committee. 
79 Tuba & Van der Westhuizen “An analysis of the know-your-client policy as an effective tool to combat money 
laundering: is it about who or what to know that counts?” 2014 International Journal Public law and Policy 53 58. 
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3.1.2 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 
The FATF was established by the G780  member states.  It is an inter-governmental policy-making 
body that aims to develop and promote national and international policies to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing.81  The FATF was established with the aim of intensifying the fight 
against money laundering and its mandate has since been increased to include the fight against 
terrorist financing. The FATF is further mandated to develop responses to proliferation financing and 
vulnerabilities in new technologies that could bring about turmoil in the financial systems across the 
world.  As the international supervisory body on money laundering and terrorist financing, the FATF 
develops policies aimed at fighting both these scourges.82  The FATF develops policy standards to be 
followed by member states, conducts research on new innovative ways to fight money laundering, 
financing of terrorism, assesses, monitors worldwide compliance with the FATF standards,  and 
responds to new threats to money laundering.83  
In 2018, the FATF consisted of 38 members and have other organisation that are observers or 
associate members.84  South Africa became a member in 2003 and has the privilege of being the only 
African country to hold membership of the FATF.85   The FATF provides guidance for governments of 
member states regarding money laundering and terrorist financing. In South Africa, the Financial 
Intelligence Centre (FIC)86 adopts all the FATF recommendations and implements them in fighting 
money-laundering activities within the borders of the Republic.   
In 1990, the FATF drew up the original FATF Forty Recommendations as an initiative to 
combat the misuse of financial systems by persons laundering drug money.  These recommendations 
were revised in 1996 for the first time to reflect evolving money laundering trends and techniques, 
and to broaden their scope well beyond drug-money laundering.87 In October 2001, the FATF 
expanded its mandate and included the issue of the financing of terrorism. It took the important step 
of creating the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.  The FATF Recommendations 
were revised a second time in 2003, and these, together with the Special Recommendations, have 
been endorsed by over 180 countries, and are universally recognised as the international standard for 
anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT).88 The risk-based 
approach was a FATF initiative. Its recommendation of the risk-based approach gives guidance on 
how to approach risk assessment and risk management. 
                                                          
80The Group of Seven (G7) is a group consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. These countries have the seven largest advanced economies in the world, representing 58% of the global 
net wealth.    
81 FATF “About us” http://www.FATF-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/whoweare (accessed on 13-08-2019). 
82 FATF International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation 
(2012-2019) 6 (https://www.fatf-/documents/recommendations/pdfs/pdf (16-08-2019)). 
83 (n 81). 
84 FATF http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers (accessed on 16 August 2019).  
85 FATF http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers (accessed on 16 August 2019).  
86 The Financial Intelligence Centre is a statutory body established in terms of s 2 of FICA.  
87 (n 82). 
88 (n 82). 
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The 2003 Forty Recommendations recognized certain risk-based principles in relation to anti-
money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism.  These recommendations allowed member 
states to adopt and follow a risk-based approach to combating money laundering and terror financing 
and allowed financial institutions to adopt their own control measures based on the 
recommendations.89  
Member states of the FATF must design their regulatory framework to incorporate a 
comprehensive risk-based approach.  A risk-based approach allows the regulated institutions to 
determine the relevant risks and develop a strategy to deal with the identified risks.90 
The FATF risk-based approach guides member states to compel their financial institutions to 
comply with the AML/CFT. Either in addition to the general risk principle referred to above, the risk-
based approach is incorporated into the Recommendations or it is inherently part of , or linked to, 
those Recommendations. For institutions, businesses and professions covered by the FATF 
Recommendations, risk is addressed in four principal areas namely:- 
 Customer due diligence measures.91  
 Institutions’ internal control systems.92  
 The approach to regulation and oversight by competent authorities.93  
 Provision for countries to allow designated non-financial businesses and professions to 
take the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing into account in a similar way to 
financial institutions.94 
 
Depending on the level of risk, member states may determine the level of compliance for their 
institutions if they are dealing with low risk cases.  In addition, countries are required to consider the 
risk of money laundering and terrorist financing when they decide which financial institutions should 
be licenced or registered and subjected to AML/CFT.95 
The FATF recommendations consist of a comprehensive list and framework of measures, that 
countries should implement in order to combat money laundering, terrorism financing, and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.96  These recommendations are set as internationally 
accepted standards to be implemented by each country with the purpose of risk identification, the 
protection of the financial sector, the establishment of competent authorities and the facilitation of 
international cooperation.97   
                                                          
89 FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach to Combating Money Laundering and Terror Financing- High Level 
Principles and Procedures (2007) par. 1.7. (https://www.fatf-/documents/reports/.pdf (17-08-2019)). 
90 (n 89) par. 1.24. 
91 FATF (n 82) 5-9. 
92 FATF (n 82) 15-22. 
93 FATF (n 82) 23. 
94 FATF (n 82) 12, 16 and 24. 
95 (n 89).  
96 FATF (n 82) 7. 
97 De Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law  (2006) 26. 
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The Forty Recommendations fall into three categories and are divided into four main groups.98 
The four main groups are the following:- 
1.  General framework.99 
2.  Improvement of national legal systems to combat money laundering.100  
3. Enhancement of the role of the financial system.101   
4.  Strengthening of international cooperation.102  
   
The first of the three categories is an explanation of what law-making bodies must do to create a legal 
framework to combat money laundering.  The second consists of financial regulatory 
recommendations that outline how countries should regulate their financial systems.  The third relates 
to international cooperation recommendations that clarify how governments should facilitate 
cooperation among one another.103 
 The financial provisions of the Forty Recommendations mirror general KYC standard 
provisions. The FATF recommends that banks eliminate anonymous accounts and make use of 
record keeping and suspicious-transactions reporting to counteract money-laundering schemes.104 
Legislative measures of the Forty Recommendations offer guidance to countries on how to identify, 
trace, evaluate and confiscate the benefits of crime.105 
In terms of the FATF recommendations, financial institutions are expected to enforce the KYC 
rules strictly.106   Recommendation 5 states that financial institutions should undertake customer due 
diligence measures, including the identification and verification of customers when establishing a 
business relationship or carrying out a single transaction. Customer identification and verification 
must take place before and during the establishment of the business relationship.107   
The recommendations dealing with CDD are similar to the provisions of section 21 of FICA 
and FIC guidance notes are based on the FATF 40 Recommendations.108  The latest revision of the 
FATF Recommendations was carried out in 2012 after consultation with stakeholders. It enhanced the 
customer due diligence measures, by dealing, inter alia, with politically connected persons.109  The 
2012 version also intensified the risk-based approach. 
 
                                                          
98 FATF (n 82) 1–40. 
99 FATF (n 82) 1-3. 
100 FATF (n 82) 4-8. 
101 FATF (n 82) 9-29. 
102 FATF (n 82) 30-40. 
103 Van Jaarsveld Aspects of Money Laundering in South Africa (2011) 225. 
104 FATF (n 82) 20-25. 
105 FATF (n 82) 8. 
106 FATF (n 82) 10. 
107 De Koker (n 97) 26. 
108FinMark Trust South African Country Report (2015) http://www.finmark.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Microsoft-
Word-10.-South-Africa-Rep_AML_Country_SouthAfrica_20152.pdf (11-09-2019). 
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3.1.3 Basel I, II and III: International regulation for banks.  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is the primary global standard setter for the 
prudential regulation of banks and provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory 
matters. Its 45 members comprise central banks and bank supervisors from 28 jurisdictions.110 
The BCBS was formed in 1974 in response to the liquidation of a certain European bank. 111  It 
was formed by the Group of Ten (G10) nations112 under the supervision of the Bank of International 
Settlements, which is situated in Basel, Switzerland.  The G10 consist of 11 industrialised nations that 
meet on an annual basis, or more frequently, to consult, debate and cooperate on international 
monetary matters. The purpose of the BCBS is to act as the primary global standard setter for the 
prudential regulation of banks and it provides a forum for consistent cooperation on banking 
supervisory matters.113  
The BCBS’s main goals are to close gaps in international supervisory coverage so that no 
banking establishment would escape supervision and that there is consistent supervision of banks 
across member states.114 
In 1975, the BCBS published the Concordat, a paper that set out the principles for sharing 
supervisory responsibility for banks which was revised over course of time.115  In 1996, the G10 drew 
up a report, which covered the supervision of cross border banking.  The report consisted of various 
proposals to help overcome the impairments to effective supervision of cross border banking  and 
emerging market economies.116  The report, which was dubbed the Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision, contained 29 principles that the BSBS believed should be in place for a 
supervisory system to be effective.117 
The BCBS plays an important role in combatting money laundering and terrorist financing due 
to its supervisory role in international banks and by assisting banks in suppressing money-laundering 
activities.118  The BCBS issued statements that provide prevention principles which include customer 
identification and on going due diligence.119  The BCBS placed an emphasis on the importance of 
KYC and CDD, making the point that banks with inadequate KYC standards are subject to high 
risks.120 
Particularly relevant to the KYC standard is Core Principle 18, entitled “Abuse of financial 
services” which requires that banks should have policies in place to prevent them from being used for 
                                                          
110 BCBS-Overview https://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm?m=3%7C14%7C625 (13-10-2019). 
111 BCBS (n 110). 
112 These nations are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and United States. 
113 (n 103). 
114 BCBS History of Basel Committee https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm.  (14 August 2019). 
115 (n 114). 
116 (n 114). 
117 BCBS Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision  (2012) https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf 21 69. 
118 BCBS (n 117) 14. 
119 BCBS General Guide to Account Opening (2015) par 15 https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d331.pdf (12-09-2019). 
120 BCBS Consolidated KYC Risk Management (2004) par 11 https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs110.pdf (19-09-2019).  
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criminal purposes.  To this end, most of the essential criteria listed in support of Core Principle 18 
describe the contents of a sound KYC programme.121 Significantly, bank supervisors are required to 
ensure that banks have internal policies in place that provide for: a customer acceptance policy; 
customer identification and due diligence programmes processed to monitor suspicious transactions; 
referrals to senior management of decisions to contract with high-risk customers; and unambiguous 
rules concerning the keeping of customer records.122 
After the global financial crisis, there was a need to review the previous Basel I and II in 
response to the financial crisis.  This gave birth to the Basel III in 2010.123  Basel III was therefore a 
response to the global financial crisis. Hence, as to be expected, it revisited the regulatory framework 
for banks. The regulatory framework of Basil III was based on the following three important issues:124 
(i) enhanced capital framework of Basel III, which was based on the three pillars of Basil  II; (ii) 
increasing the quality and quantity of bank capital; and (iii) introducing specific risk management 
controls, which were based on the KYC policies.   
The identification and dealing with risk was in line with the requirements of FATF policies but 
Basil III was not intended to replace the FATF.  The intention of Basil III was not to duplicate the work 
of the FATF but to support the adoption and implementation of the FATF recommendations regarding 
risk assessment and risk management in the banking sector.125 Basil III has a role of being prudential 
in nature when dealing with banks.  In 1988, the BSBS issued a document entitled the Prevention of 
Criminal Use of the Banking System for Money Laundering , which stated that: 
“This Statement of Principles is intended to outline some basic policies and procedures that banks’ 
managements should ensure are in place within their institutions with a view to assisting in the 
suppression of money laundering through the banking system, national and international. The 
Statement thus sets out to reinforce existing best practices among banks and, specifically, to 
encourage vigilance against criminal use of the payments system, implementation by banks of effective 
preventive safeguards and cooperation with law enforcement agencies.”126  
 
In issuing the Statement, the BCBS warned that criminals might intentionally or unintentionally 
employ banks as conduits for money obtained through unlawful means.127  The BCBS was wary of 
banks being associated with criminals as this has the potential to erode public confidence in the 
banking system.  The BCBS therefore endeavoured to outlaw anonymous bank accounts and took as 
a point of departure the interest that a bank has in maintaining a positive image. 128  
The statement required a bank to have appropriate policies and processes in place, which 
include strict KYC rules that promote high ethical and professional standards in the financial sector. 
                                                          
121 BCBS Core Principles Methodology (2006) https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs130.pdf  (24-10-2019). 
122 Van Jaarsveld (n 103) 218. 
123 (n 110). 
124 (n 110). 
125 BCBS Sound Management of Risk related to Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism  (2016) 1 
(https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d353.pdf (28-10-2019)). 
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The banks are warned to be vigilant against criminal use of the payment system. The aim of the 
statement was to strengthen or improve measures that had already been put in place by the banking 
sector to thwart the criminal use of the payment system. Prior to the release of the statement, the 
efforts that were undertaken with the objective of preventing the banking system from being used in 
this way were largely undertaken by judicial and regulatory bodies.129  The BCBS recognised that the 
main function of bank supervision was to maintain overall financial stability of the banks rather than to 
ensure that individual transactions conducted by bank customers are lawful.130  
KYC was one of the topics in the Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision (Core 
Principles)131  which were developed in 1991 because of the BCBS’s recognition of weaknesses in the 
banking systems of countries that threatened the banking system internationally.132  These Core 
Principles were endorsed by the central banks of the members of the G10.133  Out of the 25 Principles 
endorsed, Principle 15 revisited and re-emphasised the importance of the KYC standard and imposed 
on bank supervisors a responsibility to ensure that banks have measures in place that dea l with 
KYC.134  It also encouraged supervisors to adopt the recommendations of the FATF that apply to 
financial institutions that relate to customer identification. 
The BCBS Customer Due Diligence for Banks,135  hereafter CDD for Banks (2001), is the most 
comprehensive document pertaining to KYC standards released by the Basel Committee.136   In its 
introduction, it states that belief in the significance of knowing one’s customer is gaining traction and 
momentum around the world. Knowing one’s customer is part of  the internal controls that a bank has 
to put in place in order to minimise risks. The document further says that the banks will be unable to 
protect themselves effectively from such risks if they do not conduct customer due diligence in 
identifying their customers and understanding their business.137    
The KYC standards in the CDD for Banks (2001) are mostly associated with the fight against 
money laundering and identifies four fundamental elements of a sound KYC programme. The four 
elements are customer acceptance policy, customer identification, on-going monitoring of high risk 
accounts and risk management.138  The customer acceptance policy requires that banks develop a 
clear acceptance policy and procedure139, which must describe the type of customer regarded as risky 
as per customer profile.  The document requires that customers who pose a high risk must be 
subjected to the most rigorous and enhanced customer due diligence and if the risk is minimal, the 
customer must be subjected to most basic customer due diligence. 
                                                          
129 BCBS (n 126) par 2. 
130 BCBS (n 126) par 3. 
131 BCBS (n117). 
132 BCBS (n 117) 2017, par 1. 
133 BCBS (n 117) 2017, par 4. 
134 Van Jaarsveld (n 103) 217. 
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Customer identification requires that the bank know the identity of the person with whom it 
seeks to do business. This identification is the most indispensable part of KYC. 140   The document 
bars the bank from entering into a business relationship with a customer before the identity of that 
customer is satisfactorily established.141  Customers must identify themselves with documents that 
are not easily counterfeited or faked, for example, an identity document.142  Customers must be 
identified at the onset of the relationship143 and all documents necessary to establish the identity of 
the customer to the satisfaction of the bank, must be gathered and the intended nature of the 
business relationship must be ascertained,144  and if there are issues with identification the account 
must be closed.145   Furthermore, no anonymous or fictitious accounts operated under fictitious names 
should be opened or maintained.146  
In identifying trusts, where an extra layer of CDD is required because of the trust status, banks 
have to make sure, whether a customer is acting as a front or acting as a trustee, and if so, extra 
vigilance is required in identifying the customer by profiling the natural persons involved. 147  This also 
goes for natural persons using corporate vehicles to operate anonymous accounts. Banks are 
required to identify the beneficial owners of the corporate vehicle and conduct proper customer due 
diligence in relation to such beneficial owners.148   
CDD for Banks (2001) further prescribes that in the case of a business relationship with 
politically exposed person, the CDD must be rigorous as these persons are public officials entrusted 
with public funds.149   
Due to the increase in use of technology and internet banking, banks sometimes conclude 
business relationships with customers who are not face-face customers. In this case, banks are 
expected to apply the same CDD measures as in relation to a face-to-face customer.150   
 On-going monitoring is an essential aspect of effective KYC procedure. By conducting 
on-going monitoring, banks reduce the level of risk emerging from an existing customer. Hence, 
banks are required to monitor high-risk accounts carefully.151  Effective KYC standards require proper 
oversight on management, proper governance and proper controls to eliminate the likelihood of risk 
having a negative impact on the bank. The leadership of the bank is required to monitor all banking 
activities, to identify risk, assess risk and mitigate it in order to reduce the impact on the bank. 152  
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3.1.4 The Wolfsberg Principles. 
The Wolfsberg Group is an association of thirteen global private banks,153  which aims to 
develop frameworks and guidance for the management of financial crime risks, particularly with 
respect to KYC and anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing policies.154 The Group came 
together in 2000 to work on anti-money laundering guidelines for private banking. The Wolfsberg Anti-
Money Laundering (AML) Principles for Private Banking were published in October 2000, revised in 
May 2002 and again, most recently, in June 2012.155  
The Wolfberg Group has issued various guidance notes dealing with various aspects of anti -
money laundering and terrorism financing and how private banks should approach due diligence in 
dealing with various persons, including politically connected persons. 
The Wolfsberg Group recognises that adherence to existing KYC policies and procedure is 
important for the fight against terrorism.  Specifically, the proper identification of customers by 
financial institutions can improve the efficacy of searches of known suspected terrorists.  In addition 
to continued application of existing customer identification, acceptance and due diligence procedure 
the Wolfsberg Group committed to:- 
 Implement processes for consulting the applicable list and take reasonable steps to 
determine whether a prospective customer or existing business relationship is on the list.  
 If the prospective customer or existing business relationship is on the list, report that to the 
authorities. 
 Improve information exchange with government agencies. 
 Maintain customer information for ease of retrieval.156 
 
3.1.5 The United Nations Security Council. 
The 1988 UN Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Convention (hereinafter, Drugs 
Convention) was the first international document to illustrate the intention of states to counter money 
laundering. It introduced the global determination to “deprive persons engaged in illicit traffic of the 
proceeds of their criminal activities and thereby eliminate their main incentive”.157 
The UN Security Council took a resolution to administer financial sanctions measures in line 
with the FATF Recommendations.158   The FATF Recommendations require member countries to 
implement the targeted financial sanctions proposed by the UN Security Council in the context of 
                                                          
153 These banks are Banco Santander, Bank of America, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman 
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combating the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.159   UN Security Council 
Resolution 1617 (2005) and the Annexed Plan of Action of Resolution 60/288 of the UN General 
Assembly (20 September 2006), stress the importance of the implementation of the FATF 40 
Recommendations and the 9 Special Recommendations on terrorist financing. The Resolution in part   
“strongly urges all Member States to implement the comprehensive, international standards embodied 
in the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and the 
FATF Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing’’.160    
The accountable institutions are required under the UN Security Council resolutions to 
establish and verify the identity of a person listed under the sanctions list and if they have a 
sanctioned person, the accountable institution must act in accordance with requirements of the UN 
Security Council recommendations.  The South African legislation, FICA, in this instance criminalises 
the failure by accountable institutions to report a sanctioned person.161   The updated sanctions list is 
maintained by the FIC, and for ease of access, is available on its website.162    
 
3.1.6 Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group.  
The Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) is a regional body, 
comprised of 18 member states,163  which subscribes to the global standards of combating money 
laundering and terrorism financing.  Its 16 member states are Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  Rwanda  has  been  formally  admitted  as  a  
member  of  the  ESAAMLG but  has  not  yet  fully  taken  up  its  role  as  an active member of the 
organisation.164 The ESAAMLG was launched in 1999 by 9 commonwealth countries of the region, 
namely Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, in Arusha in Tanzania.165   
The group was formed with a mission to work towards “a strong and dynamic FATF Style 
Regional Body committed to eradicate money laundering and terrorist financing in the Eastern and 
Southern African region”. The vision was to be realised through consolidating and sustaining the 
combined efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist and proliferation financing in the Eastern 
and Southern African region by effective implementation of AML/CFT standards in all ESAAMLG 
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member countries.166 The ESAAMLG countries have signed a memorandum of understanding in 
terms of which they have bound themselves to adopt the FATF Recommendations. The signing of the 
MOU created an opportunity for collaboration, cooperation and the exchange of information regarding 
matters of anti-money laundering and terrorism financing.167   
 
3.1.7 The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units.  
Founded in 1995 by a small group of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), following the adoption by the 
FATF of its first recommendations on money laundering and terrorist financing, the Egmont Group 
operated for a long time in a free-flowing manner more akin to a club than to an international 
organization.168 
The Egmont Group is a united body of 164 FIUs. The Egmont Group provides a platform for 
the secure exchange of expertise and financial intelligence to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing.169  
The FIUs of every country analyse information pursuant to money laundering and terrorism 
financing.  These FIUs of various countries have been organised under the banner of the Egmont 
Group of Financial Intelligence Units.170 South Africa is a member state and the Financial Intelligence 
Centre joined the Egmont Group in July 2003.  The goal of the Egmont Group is to provide a forum 
for FIUs around the world to improve cooperation in the fight against money laundering and financing 
of terrorism and to foster the implementation of domestic programs in this field. 171 This support 
includes: 
• expanding and systematizing international cooperation in the reciprocal exchange of 
information; 
• increasing the effectiveness of FIUs by offering training and promoting personnel 
exchanges to improve the expertise and capabilities of personnel employed by FIUs;  
• fostering better and secure communication among FIUs through the application of 
technology, such as the Egmont Secure Web (ESW); 
• fostering increased coordination and support among the operational divisions of 
member FIUs; 
• promoting the operational autonomy of FIUs; and 
• promoting the establishment of FIUs in conjunction with jurisdictions with an AML/CFT 
program in place, or in areas with a program in the early stages of development.  
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3.1.8 Conclusion.  
Different international regulatory bodies regulate the identification and verification of customers by  
banks as a requirement widely insisted upon by regulators.  It is common in all regulatory bodies that 
an approach to establishment and verification of customers be guided by the risk-based approach.  
International regulatory bodies assist in collaboration, cooperation and sharing of information 
regarding issues of money laundering and terrorism financing.  These regulatory bodies also monitor 
the compliance levels with their guidance requirements and assist each member state to comply as 
per the guidance notes. 
 
3.2. The South African legislative framework. 
   
3.2.1 The 2001 Financial Intelligence Centre Act. 
 
3.2.1.1 Introduction. 
Any bank-customer relationship normally begins with the opening of a bank account. Apart from the 
common law, statutory law also requires that the identity of the prospective customer be established 
and verified.  This requirement assists the bank to prevent criminals from infiltrating the banking 
system. 
The need to identify and verify the identity of a potential customer (KYC/CDD) arise from 
international standards advocated by the FATF,172 the BCBS173 and the United Nations Security 
Council.174 These standards have influenced South Africa to enact the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act (FICA).175 FICA prescribes the steps that accountable institutions, which include banks, should 
follow in order to conduct proper identification and verification of the customer. This dissertation will 
focus mainly on this part of FICA, which deals with identification and verification of customers by 
banks. 
  
3.2.1.2 The Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA). 
FICA originated from the publication of the Money Laundering Control Bill by the South African Law 
Commission in August 1996.176 The bill formed part of the report titled “Money Laundering and 
Related Matters by South African Law Commission”.177 It provided for a regulatory mechanism to deal 
with money laundering. Following the due process of consultation with stakeholders, it was passed 
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into law and signed by the President on 28 November 2001, with the date of becoming effective 
dependant on proclamation by the President. The provisions regarding the establishment of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) and the Counter Money Laundering Advisory Council (CMLAC) as 
well as those that enabled the writing of the regulations under the Act came into effect on 1 February 
2002. 
FICA, since 2003, has been the key regulatory tool to protect the integrity of the South African 
financial system against money laundering and the financing of terrorism.  It is the main anti-money 
laundering legislation, with other statutes playing a supporting role.178 FICA compromises of five 
chapters and four schedules. Chapter 1 deals with the establishment of the FIC.  Chapter Two, while 
in existence, dealt with the CMLAC. The Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act,179 however, 
repealed this part of the Act. Chapter 3 deals with anti-money laundering control measures, whereas 
Chapter 4 deals with money laundering offences and penalties. Chapter Five is devoted to 
miscellaneous provisions. The four schedules deal with the list of accountable institutions, 
supervisory bodies, reportable transactions and amendments to the relevant statutes respectively.  
The FIC is required to provide and issue guidance notes to accounting institutions, supervisory 
bodies and other persons listed in the Act.180 In order to understand and interpret the Act properly, it 
should best be read together with the regulations, exemptions and guidance notes issued in terms of 
it. FICA had its own challenges and loopholes and its success in customer identification and 
verification has been limited.  This led to the tabling of the Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment 
Bill in 2015, to ensure the Act’s alignment with international standards as set out in the 2012 FATF 
Amendments.181 The President eventually signed the Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act  in 
2017. One of the significant changes brought by the amendments was the introduction of a risk-based 
approach to customer due diligence as opposed to the previous rule-based approach. 
The main purposes of FICA, as amended, are: the establishment of the FIC;182 the imposition 
of certain duties on financial institutions - and other persons or institutions that might be used for 
money laundering, terrorist financing and related activities; to provide for customer due diligence 
measures with respect to beneficial ownership and persons in prominent positions; to provide for a 
risk-based approach to client identification and verification; to provide for the implementation of 
financial sanctions and to administer measures pursuant to resolutions adopted by the Security 
Council of the United Nations. Additionally FICA purports to clarify the application of the Act in 
relation to other laws and to provide for the sharing of information by the FIC and supervisory bodies.  
                                                          
178 The Prevention of Organized Crime Act, commonly referred to as POCA, is one of the other statutes that criminalizes 
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Further purposes include to provide for risk management and compliance programmes; 
governance and training relating to anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing; the 
issuance of directives by the FIC and supervisory bodies; the registration of accountable and 
reporting institutions; the roles and responsibilities of supervisory bodies; written arrangements 
relating to the respective roles and responsibilities of the Centre and supervisory bodies; the granting 
to the FIC and supervisory bodies of powers to conduct inspections; the regulation of certain 
applications to Court; administrative sanctions that may be imposed by the FIC and supervisory 
bodies; the establishment of an appeal board to hear appeals against decisions of the FIC or 
supervisory bodies; consultation with stakeholders; the amendment of the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act (POCA),183 and the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA);184 and matters 
connected to the above.185 
FICA forms part of the legal framework that deals with money laundering prevention, and 
criminalises it in line with the provisions of POCA.186  It has been amended over the years to bring it in 
line with international standards. The 2017 amendments have resulted in widening the purpose of the 
Act and removing certain exemptions to bring it in line with world standards in the financial industry. 
FICA is applicable to accountable institutions, which include banks and other financial institutions, 
supervisory bodies, reporting institutions and other legal persons who were previously exempted from 
reporting. It creates a legal framework for the effective identification and verification of customers’ 
identities and for recordkeeping of their transactions, who they transact with and what amounts are 
involved in those transactions.187  
Furthermore, FICA requires accountable institutions to upskill their employees through 
vigorous and continuous training on latest anti-money laundering techniques and compliance 
monitoring.188 Section 2 of FICA provides for the establishment of the FIC, a regulatory body tasked 
with the purpose of collecting information, analysing the information collected and passing it on to 
relevant enforcement agencies if there are suspicions of crime being committed. 
The amendments of FICA give effect to the purpose of FICA in various ways by ensuring that 
the Act is capable of delivering a sound protected financial system for South Africa, by introducing a 
risk-based approach in line with FATF Recommendations, the BCBS and the United Nations Security 
Council requirements on anti-money laundering and terrorist financing strategy. 
 
3.2.1.3 The Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC). 
The FIC is a statutory body established in terms of the Act. The principal objective of the FIC is to 
assist in the identification of the proceeds of unlawful activities and the combating of money 
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laundering activities and the financing of terrorist and related activities.189  Other objectives include 
making collected information available to various entities.190 
The FIC is not a supervisory body, since FICA does not empower it to supervise any bodies or 
institutions. However, it must monitor and give guidance to accountable institutions, supervisory 
bodies and other persons regarding the performance of their duties and their compliance with FICA.191  
The FIC has provided extensive guidance in respect of administrative, compliance and reporting 
duties in the form of Guidance Notes that may be accessed.  Guidance Note 3A deals with how 
accountable institutions are to implement the KYC/CDD programme.  Guidance Note 4A deals with 
the reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities in terms of section 29 of FICA.  
Guidance Note 5B deals with cash threshold reporting in terms of section 28 of FICA.  Guidance Note 
6 assists accountable institutions to implement terrorist financing and terrorist property reporting 
obligations in terms of section 28A and section 29 of FICA.  Guidance Note 7 deals with the 
implementation of various aspects of the Act and the adoption of a risk-based approach (general 
principles, risk assessment and understanding of risk, risk mitigation), customer due diligence 
measures, recordkeeping, risk management and compliance programme, and the implementation of 
the United Nations Security Council Resolutions relating to the freezing of assets.  
The FIC also regulates how accountable institutions may go about freezing property of 
transgressors pursuant to financial sanctions that may be imposed in accordance with United Nations 
Security Council resolutions,192 how it will exchange information at its disposal with similar bodies in 
other countries193 and enforce total compliance with the Act or any directives or regulations in terms 
of it.194  The FIC is not an investigative agency and has no investigative powers except to assist other 
investigation agencies by providing information. 
 
3.2.1.4 The Counter Money Laundering Advisory Council. 
The Counter Money Laundering Advisory Council (CMLAC) was established in terms of FICA. 195 Its 
main purpose was to advise the Minister of Finance regarding anti-money laundering best practices 
and policies so to enable the Minister to develop a policy framework that best addresses issues of 
money laundering in line with international standards.  Nevertheless, the CMLAC was repealed by the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act196  because, according to the FIC, the CMLAC was 
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seen as “too rigid and did not facilitate effective consultation between key stakeholders, in order to 
promote the objective of combating money laundering and terrorist financing”.197  
The Council consisted of various government representatives and representatives of 
categories of accountable institutions and supervisory bodies.198  The structure of the CMLAC turned 
out to be too inflexible and did not facilitate effective consultation between key stakeholders, in order 
to promote the purpose of combating money laundering and terrorist financing.199  Therefore, in 2017 
the Amendment Act repealed the chapter in FICA that established the CMLAC.  The objective with 
this removal of the CMLAC is to replace the CMLAC with more effective, and non-statutory, 
consultation forums, to encourage deeper collaboration and consultation in the implementation of the 
framework to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.200 
The objective of doing away with CMLAC was to find a way to replace the CMLAC with an 
independent, objective, non-statutory body that will promote better consultation with stakeholders in 
implementation of anti-money laundering and terrorist financing strategy.  Furthermore, there was a 
need to establish a committee of experts from within the economic and security cluster that will 
ensure total compliance, more collaboration and information sharing amongst the stakeholders, and 
that will deal decisively with any money laundering and terrorist financing traits. 
 
3.2.1.5 Link to other legislative instruments. 
Money laundering refers to any act that disguises the criminal nature or the location of the proceeds 
of a crime.201 The provisions combating money laundering in South Africa have broadened the 
concept to virtually every act or transaction that involves the proceeds of a crime, including the 
spending of funds that were acquired illegally.202 
South Africa has developed a comprehensive legal framework to combat money laundering 
and terrorist financing in recent years.203  The first generation of combating money laundering in 
South Africa was developed in 1992 and was set out in the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act. 204  The 
provisions of this Act were limited and only applied to the proceeds of drug-related offences.205   
The Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996 introduced the second generation of money laundering 
provisions. The scope of money laundering provisions was broadened by this Act to include the 
proceeds of any type of offence.206  With the introduction of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
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121 of 1998 and the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001, the third generation of provisions 
combating money laundering was introduced. These acts are not only wider in their reach and more 
detailed than their predecessors are, but they also created responsibilities and duties for accountable 
institutions to combat and report suspicious transactions and money laundering. 207   
In 2004, FICA was amended by broadening the scope of the money laundering control duties 
of businesses to include the combating of the financing of terrorism when Parliament adopted the 
Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act (POCDATARA). 208  
POCDATARA was created to provide for following:-209  
 measures to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities,  
 provide for an offence of terrorism and other offences associated or connected with 
terrorist activities,  
 provide for Convention offences,  
 give effect to international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities,  
 provide for a mechanism to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 
which are binding on member States, in respect of terrorist and related activities,   
 provide for measures to prevent and combat terror financing and related activities and,  
 Provide for investigative measures in respect of such activities.   
 
FICA was amended in 2017, which is the latest addition to the combating of money laundering family.  
It defines “money laundering” and “money laundering activity” as an activity which has or is likely to 
have the effect of concealing or disguising the nature, source, location, disposition or movement of 
the proceeds of unlawful activities or any interest which anyone has in such proceeds and includes 
any activity which constitutes an offence in terms of section 64 of FICA or section 4, 5 or 6 of 
POCA.210 POCA does not define the term “money laundering” but describes the crime  of money 
laundering.211 
The FIC has, in terms of its statutory function under section 4(c) of FICA, issued a guidance 
note concerning the identification of clients. As stated above, money laundering is criminalised in 
section 4 of POCA. The money laundering offence can therefore basically be described as the 
performing of any act which may result in concealing the nature of the proceeds of crime or of 
enabling a person to avoid prosecution or in the diminishing of such proceeds. The FIC also 
describes money laundering as “the performing of any act which may result in concealing the nature 
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of the proceeds of crime or of enabling a person to avoid prosecution or in the diminishing of such 
proceeds”.212 
Van Jaarsveld213 is of the opinion that money laundering should be defined in both a narrow 
and a broad sense. Broadly defined, money laundering is an element of financial abuse and financial 
crime. The writer describes financial abuse as a system, which, because of poor regulation, facilitates 
crime and leads to the exploitation of the national and international economic systems.214   
Research has shown that the courts have not yet defined “money laundering” but they have 
instead relied on the definitions set out in FICA and POCA.  POCA determines that the proceeds of a 
crime could have been derived, directly or indirectly, in South Africa or elsewhere, at any time before 
or after the commencement of POCA.215  Proceeds include any property.216  Property in turn is 
defined as money or any other movable, immovable, corporeal or incorporeal thing and includes any 
rights, privileges, claims and securities and any interest therein and all proceeds thereof.217 
Since POCA came into effect in 1998 and FICA in 2001, the definition of money laundering 
has been extended to include the proceeds of all types of offences, including tax offences.218  Money 
laundering consists of three stages, namely placement,219 layering220 and integration.221 
In conclusion, money laundering is a global issue and, as a result, regulations combating 
money laundering must not only be introduced on a national level, but also on an international level.  
Money laundering includes a number of offences. The broad and general approach in section 1 of 
FICA is a comprehensive definition. It should, however, include the fact that the proceeds should be 
earmarked for re-introduction in the economic system. 
   
3.2.1.6 Approach to KYC/CDD. 
Customer due diligence (CDD) requires financial institutions to ensure the identification of their 
customers before entering into a business relationship or before entering into a single transaction.222   
In progressive steps, the South African legislator has over the years drafted general  money 
laundering offences by statutorily criminalising any act in respect of the proceeds of crime. This led to 
the enactment of FICA, in response to international standards laid down in FATF, BCBS and others. 
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FICA is designed to not only curb criminals from laundering money but also to ensure that 
financial institutions know whom they are doing business with.   
In terms of its statutory function under section 4(c) of FICA, the FIC has issued a guidance 
note, Guidance Note Concerning Identification of Clients.223  Therefore, not only did FICA establish 
the FIC and the MLAC which was later replaced by the risk-based approach, it also created money 
laundering control obligations and regulates access to information.224  Since 2003, when South Africa 
became a member of the FATF, FICA has been the key regulatory tool to protect financial institutions 
against illicit processes.  However, FICA was limited in its approach in assisting in the identification of 
the process of illicit activities and the combatting of money laundering.225   The Act was improved 
after South Africa’s mutual evaluation in 2009 and the FATF amendments in 2012, by the Amendment 
Act 2017. 
The identification and verification provisions of FICA are not cast in stone. It is not a situation 
of comply or die. The Minister may, after consultation with the FIC, exempt a bank from compliance 
with any of the provisions of the Act.226 
Client identification and verification must be done in accordance with Regulations 2 to 18227  
which prescribe the steps that must be undertaken to establish and verify the identity of the following 
clients: South African citizens and residents, foreign nationals, close corporations and South African 
companies, foreign companies, other legal persons, partnerships and trusts.   The FIC also issues 
guidance notes concerning the verification of identities, the reporting of suspicious and unusual 
transactions and any other obligations imposed on accountable institutions by FICA.228 
 
3.2.1.7 Rules-based approach.  
The international instruments and standard setters advocated for the risk-based approach for 
prevention of money laundering.  The initial approach to money laundering was the rules-based 
approach.  The rules-based approach required of financial institutions simply to act in accordance 
with specific rules.229Therefore, if someone meets the conditions specified in the rules, then the action 
specified in the rules should be taken.230  When applied to the KYC policy, this means that a financial 
institution would be satisfied with identifying a customer and reporting suspicious activity or cash 
transactions that are above the threshold to the relevant authority. 
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The rules-based approach had its drawbacks, which included the manipulation of the existing 
rules and principles relating to transactions.231  For instance, customers would manipulate the rules by 
depositing various cash amounts that are below the reportable threshold.  This put  the financial 
institution at risk of being used for money laundering despite complying with the rules of threshold. 232  
Furthermore, the rules-based approach could lead to over reporting of transactions.  This approach 
encouraged financial institutions to follow decisions of regulators without taking part in the decision-
making.233  Formerly, the FATF approach to money laundering was rules-based.234  The revised FATF 
recommendations of 2003 adopted a different approach. 
The 2001 FICA adopted the rules-based approach in dealing with identification and verification 
of customers.  In the approach to identify and verify customers, the regulator determines the rules 
that must apply. In a rules-based system, accountable institutions are inspected to determine whether 
they comply with the prescribed rules.  Risk is also important in this context because a reasonable 
regulator will determine the relevant rules based on its determination of risk.  
 
3.2.2 2017 Act and the amendments. 
 
3.2.2.1 Introduction.  
South Africa’s FICA aims to give effect to the FATF Recommendations, as well as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision Recommendations 8. Given the FATF emphasis on adopting a 
risk-based approach, South Africa has amended FICA accordingly.  In October 2017, FICA was 
amended to introduce the new risk-based approach to compliance, particularly CDD. The move was 
effected via the Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act (Amendment Act).235   At that point, the 
Minister of Finance, in consultation with the other regulators, withdrew the previous exemptions that 
were afforded by FICA prior the amendment.  The Amendment Act incorporates a risk-based 
approach to compliance elements such as CDD into the regulatory framework.  Accountable 
institutions are now required to understand their exposure to money laundering and terrorism 
financing and to apply a risk-based approach when carrying out CDD measures.236 
After the unsatisfactory results of the rule-based approach in South Africa, the risk-based 
approach was introduced with the 2017 Amendment Act in compliance with the similar change in 
approach set out by the FATF.237  As explained above, the risk-based approach is intended to offer a 
better, less time-intensive and more cost effective approach, permitting accountable institutions to 
focus their resources on high-risk customers and meet compliance requirements more effectively. 
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With the promulgation of the Amendment Act and the implementation of the risk-based 
approach, it appears that South Africa’s legislation endeavours are in harmony with global 
standards.238  The enforcement of FICA requires training, experts in the appropriate fields and the 
necessary equipment and technology to ensure the accountable institutions comply with the 
requirements of FICA.239  
 
3.2.2.2 Link to international instruments. 
The Amendment Act is still linked to the policies and programs of FATF.  It only strengthen the 
adoption of set of standards with regard to money laundering control.240  The Amendment Act also 
embraced the BCBS standards and their approach to risk241, the Wolfsberg principle,242 the Egmont 
Group,243 the United Nations Security Council244 and the ESAAMLG.245   
    
3.2.2.3 Approach to KYC/CDD. 
 
Risk-based approach. 
In short, the risk-based approach to combatting money laundering and terrorist financing means that 
countries, competent authorities and institutions should analyse and identify the money laundering 
and terrorism financing risks and respond appropriately to those risks in order to mitigate the risks 
that they are exposed to.246 
In 2012, the FATF reviewed its 2007 version of the risk-based approach because it wanted to 
bring the risk-based approach in line with the FATF requirements and to reflect the experience gained 
by the public authorities and the private sector over the course of its application.247  Between June 
2007 and October 2009, the FATF adopted a set of guidance papers on the application of the risk-
based approach for different business sectors.248 
The risk based approach guidance, as a document, consists of three sections.  Section one 
sets out the key elements of the risk-based approach and must be read in conjunction with sections 
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two and three, which provide for its effective implementation to banking supervisors (section two) and 
banks (section three).249 
The risk based approach guidance recognises that an effective risk based approach will 
improve a country’s legal and regulatory approach to its banking sector and risk profile.  Moreover, it 
will set out clear guidance of what a country should consider when designing and implementing a risk 
based approach.250 
It has become evident that governments require more effective tools to ensure the 
strengthening of international safeguards and for the protection of the integrity of the global financial 
system. In this regard, the risk-based approach allows countries to adopt a more flexible set of 
procedures in order to target their resources more effectively and to apply preventive measures that 
are proportionate to the nature of risks.251    
The scope and application of the risk-based approach is set out in Recommendation 1 of the 
FATF Recommendations. Firstly, a country should identify who and what should be subject to its 
AML/CFT regime. Authorities should extend their regime to those institutions and sectors that 
constitute a higher risk to money laundering and terrorism financing.252 
Secondly, it is important to understand how these institutions and sectors will be supervised 
for compliance with the risk-based approach.253  Thirdly, is it of utmost importance to determine how 
those subject to the regime should comply with the risk-based approach. Institutions or sectors 
associated with higher risk should have enhanced measures in place to mitigate their risks. 254  The 
risk-based approach is intended to offer a better, less time-intensive and more cost effective 
approach, permitting accountable institutions to focus their resources on high-risk customers and 
meet compliance requirements more effectively. This approach will ensure that the range, degree, 
and frequency or intensity of controls conducted will be more effective.255 
The basic requirement for anti-money laundering and combating of financing of terrorism in 
South Africa, such as identification and verification at the time of transaction, are prescribed in 
FICA.256  As stated above, the promulgation of FICA was to align South Africa’s anti money 
laundering efforts in line with international standards and to adopt the risk based approach as 
advocated by the FATF.257   
Risk is defined as the likelihood and impact of an uncertain event on set objectives.258 Money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism carry the inherent risk that exists before the control and 
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mitigation measures are applied. Residual risks are risks that remain after controls and mitigation 
measures have been applied. FICA requires accountable institutions to apply the risk based approach 
when carrying out customer due diligence through a risk management and compliance programme 
(RMCP).259 The RMCP is required since the Amendment Act came into force.  
The 2017 amendment of FICA introduced the Risk Management and Compliance Programme 
(RMCP) as a requirement to be implemented by accountable institution when conducting due 
diligence.260  Section 42 calls for accountable institutions to develop, document, maintain, and 
implement a programme to deal with money laundering and combating of financing of terrorism.261  
The RMCP will be influenced, inter alia, by the size of the institution concerned, but should include 
risk identification, assessment, monitoring, mitigation and management.262   
In documenting, developing, and maintaining a comprehensive risk management plan or 
programme, the accountable institution must explain how it will comply with the strict requirements of 
the customer due diligence requirement of the Act.263 These requirements replaced the regulations 
that were dealing with customer due diligence.264  Accountable institutions, in engaging clients in 
terms of section 21 and in accordance with a RMCP, must also establish whether the business 
relationship with that client will be in line with the requirements of the Act and consistent with the 
institution’s requirement to comply with the Act.  This will be achieved by establishing the nature and 
intent of the business relationship and how the business will be funded to sustain itself. 265  This will 
eliminate risk and enable accountable institutions to assess the likelihood of the impact of the risk and 
develop a plan to mitigate. 
When dealing with juristic persons, the accountable institutions must, in line with section 21, 
21A and in accordance with RMCP, establish the nature of client’s business and the ownership and 
control structure of the business, as well as identify the beneficial owner.266  These can be achieved 
by determining the identity of all natural persons who control or have interest in the business and 
natural persons who manage the juristic person, including executive officers, non-executive directors 
and all board members.267   
In addition, the accountable institutions must conduct on-going customer due diligence by 
monitoring the transactions of the clients through verification of source of funds,268 monitor unusual 
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transaction patterns269 and keep the information of clients in respect of the relationship up to date; 270 
and if in doubt about any information obtained the accountable institution must repeat all the steps 
required under section 21 of FICA and in accordance with the RMCP.271  Moreover, if the accountable 
institution is unable to identify and verify the client in compliance with the provisions of the Act and 
the RMCP, the accountable institution cannot establish a business relationship with that customer as 
doing so will invite unduly risk.272 
When dealing with a prominent foreign public official, the accounting institution must seek 
approval of senior management, establish the source of income of that foreign prominent public 
officer and conduct on-going monitoring in accordance with the RMCP.273 This is because the 
prominent foreign influential persons carry high risk as compared to prominent domestic influential 
persons.   
The identification and verification process of clients requires that the banks should adopt a 
risk-based approach when verifying customer information, in accordance with international standards. 
According to the FATF, financial institutions should apply each of the CDD measures and determine 
the extent of such measures on a risk sensitive basis depending on the type of customer, business 
relationship or transaction.274 For higher risk categories, financial institutions should perform 
enhanced due diligence. In certain circumstances, where there are low risks, countries may decide 
that financial institutions can apply reduced or simplified measures.  
The process of risk management involves risk identification, risk assessment and risk 
mitigation. The risk-based approach means that countries, competent authorities and financial 
institutions, are expected to identify, assess and understand the ML/TF risks to which they are 
exposed and apply measures that are appropriate to those risks in order to mitigate them 
effectively.275  This means that risk identification is a process to identify money laundering and 
financing of terrorism risks faced by an accountable institution through a comprehensive and specific 
risk evaluation of services offered. This is the starting point of the risk-based approach.276  
Assessing risk means that countries, competent authorities and banks have to determine how 
the money laundering and terrorist financing threats that have been identified will affect them. They 
should analyse the information obtained to understand the likelihood of these risks occurring, and the 
impact that the risks would have, on the individual banks, the banking sector and possibly on the 
national economy for large scale, systemic financial institutions, if they occurred. 277  This means that 
risk assessment is a process to assess the impact on an accountable institution of the money 
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laundering and terrorism financing risks identified and formulate the basis for specific action to 
mitigate. 
The FATF Recommendations require that, when applying a risk-based approach, banks, 
countries and competent authorities decide on the most appropriate and effective way to mitigate the 
risk they have identified by taking enhanced measures to manage and mitigate the risk.278  Under a 
risk-based approach, accountable institutions are required to collect and verify information about 
specific customer’s profile and activities, compare that information with the results of risk assessment 
conducted in accordance with risk identification and assessment and determine and implement 
effective measures to mitigate the identified risks. 
The FIC issues Guidance Notes as guiding documents on how banks should approach the risk 
assessment of client identification and verification. According to Guidance Note 1, issued by FIC in  
April 2004, the banks are not required, in terms of their customer identification and verification 
obligations under FICA, to follow a one-size-fits-all approach.279  Rather, a bank must determine in 
specific instances what information may be required in order to achieve verification of the particulars 
of a client and the means by which the said verification can be achieved. The bank needs to  try to 
strike a balance between the accuracy of the verification required and the level of effort invested in 
the means to obtain such verification, and the said balance must be proportionate with the nature of 
the risk involved in a given business relationship or transaction.280 The latest Guidance Note 7 issued 
by FlC, is a comprehensive document that is a result of the 2017 amendment of FICA.  This 
document analyses and records how accountable institutions should go about in dealing with risk 
factors in a business relationship. 
The test for the risk approach assessment in verification is that of a reasonable man. Any 
person under the bank’s employment, who has to determine the relevant risk that his/her bank will be 
facing by entering into a business relationship with a particular customer will have to ask 
himself/herself how a reasonable person in a comparable institution would rate the risk involved with 
regard to a particular client, a particular product and a particular transaction. 281  Next to be 
determined is the foreseeable danger in respect of money laundering occurring with the client profile, 
product type or transaction in question. The risk that a client poses to the bank must be determined 
on a holistic basis, that is, the ultimate risk rating accorded to a particular client must be a function of 
all factors, which may be relevant to the combination of a particular customer profile, product type and 
transaction.282 
Other Guidance Notes followed Guidance Note 1.  In 2005, FIC issued Guidance Note 3A 
which sought to identify risk indicators to be used to differentiate between customers. Certain factors 
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are identified as indications that a business relationship or a single transaction poses a high risk of 
facilitating money laundering activities, or the presence of the proceeds of unlawful activities.  Some 
of the risk factors the banks need to be alert to, are those on face value, looks or may constitute a 
legitimate business transaction. The latest Guidance Note 7 deals specifically with risk and highlights 
all-important aspects of risk management, starting from understanding risk-to-risk mitigation.   
In the process of identification and verification of customers by accountable institutions, they 
should adopt a risk-based approach as opposed to the rule-based approach, which requires clients to 
deal with tick boxes in order to be compliant.283  The risk-based approach ensures an adequate time 
to assess, prevent, manage or mitigate money-laundering risks and also affords the accountable 
institutions the opportunity to use available mechanisms and to create innovative ways of dealing with 
risks identified.284 Inherent risk assessment requires accountable institutions to deal with risks that 
exist before the process of mitigation is employed. In the context of money laundering and financing 
of terrorism, the risk is the “likelihood and impact of money laundering and terrorism f inancing 
activities that could materialise because of a combination of threats and vulnerabilities manifesting in 
an accountable institution”285  and the negative influence on detection, investigation and prosecution 
of money laundering and terrorist financing activities. 
The risk factors identifiable in money laundering perspective are as follows: - 
  (i) The nature of the bank’s products and the potential of abuse of those products .  
(ii) A client appears to have accounts with several banks in one geographical area.  
(iii)  A client wishes to have credit and debit cards sent to destinations other than his 
address.  
(vi)  A client is reluctant to provide complete information regarding his activities.  
(v)  A business client’s representatives avoid contact with  the branch.286  
 
The risk assessment process by accountable institutions can be carried out either as a business -
based risk assessment, which dwells on internal ways of risk mitigation by the accountable 
institutions, or relationship-based risk assessment which is the risk specifically imposed by the client 
themselves.287 The business-based risk assessment refers to the internal policies, which accountable 
institutions are required to develop as a mechanism on how to deal with inherent risk identified, and 
appropriate mitigating factors for that inherent risk.288  The relationship-based risk assessment looks 
at the profile of the client created at the start of the relationship and requires that the risk assessment 
should be on-going.  After the assessment of risk, the accountable institution must take steps to 
manage and mitigate risk through increase in monitoring, higher due diligence, conduct vetting and 
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periodic verification of customer information.  Management and mitigation of risk, in the money 
laundering and terrorist financing context, entail the dealing with identified risks within an accountable 
institution, by developing systems and controls to manage the risks.289  
The information that a bank must obtain in the aforegoing circumstances must be adequate to 
enable the bank to determine whether transactions involving a client are consistent with the bank’s 
knowledge of that client and that client’s business activities. This information must include particulars 
concerning:  
i)  The source of that client’s income;290 and  
ii)  The source of the funds that the particular client expects to use in concluding the single 
transaction or transactions in the course of the business relationship.291 
 
In concluding the relationship building between banks and their customers, it is important to note that 
any relationship between accountable institutions and customers starts with the establishment and 
verification of identities of the customers. This requirement is a common law requirement and 
statutory law requirement, and even more, an internationally accepted procedure of conducting due 
diligence. The accountable institution must conduct CDD in terms of legislation and recommendations 
of international banking regulators. 
In the process of conducting CDD, the regulators have developed a risk-based approach in 
trying to deal with all inherent and residual risk that goes with the process of establishing a business 
relationship with customers.  All stakeholders involved are required to conduct proper risk 
management to eliminate or minimise the money laundering and terrorism financing activities. These 
criminal activities have a potential to render any country’s banking sector ineffective or to paralyse it. 
Risk identification, risk assessment and risk mitigation as tools for the risk-based approach are 
used differently from one customer to another depending on likelihood of risk occurring. For instance, 
domestic influential persons are regarded as low risk as compared to foreign influential persons. The 
risk management programme implemented to deal with these scenarios differ.  
 
3.3 FICA focused KYC/CDD. 
   
3.3.1 Introduction. 
CDD constitutes standards and guidelines for banks to follow when conducting business with existing 
and new clients. This is articulated in section 21 of FICA, which obliges accountable institutions to 
take certain steps to establish and verify the identity of their new clients and/or existing clients.   The 
identification and verification procedures require that a bank take cognisance of all aspects 
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surrounding a client’s identification, in line with the Risk Management Compliance Programme.292  A 
bank that fails to obtain sufficient knowledge about the identity of a customer and the nature of his 
business would in turn be unable to identify a particular transaction as unusual or suspicious.293  The 
identification obligation further means that banks have to conduct customer profiling, by means of 
familiarising themselves with the background of the customer, his/her credentials and earning 
capacity.294 
The obligations of identification and verification created by section 21 of FICA are concurrent. 
The bank cannot achieve the verification obligation without having complied with the obligation of 
establishing the identity of the customer. That which has not been identified can, after all, not be 
verified. Both the identification and verification requirements stipulated by FICA are based on best 
international practice.295  It is accepted that a bank will be able to comply with its identification and 
verification obligations only if its employees have been trained to undertake the same and 
accountable institutions are mandated to train their employees to comply with the Act and the anti-
money laundering rules of the bank.296  It is a criminal offence to fail to comply with the training 
obligations created by FICA.  
KYC/CDD is a process by which accountable institutions reasonably satisfy themselves that 
the prospective customer is who he/she/it claims to be, whether the prospective customer is acting on 
behalf of another party and that there are no legal or policy reasons barring the accountable 
institution from entering into a business relationship with the customer.297 
In South Africa, as pointed out above, a helpful legal framework relating to the obligations on 
banks to identify and verify customers has already been structured within the context of the potential 
delictual liability of banks that have opened accounts for customers thereby enabling them to defraud 
others.298 Further guidance is available from the South African Reserve Bank Act,299 and, 
internationally, from the FATF,300 the BCBS,301 and, most recently, and to a limited extent, the United 
Nations Security Council.302 In this dissertation, the emphasis is on FICA and its regulations. 
Financial Institutions are required by FICA to perform certain functions. A financial institution is 
an institution that, in conducting business, issues means of payment, takes deposits, lends money, 
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performs money transfers and exchanges money for clients.303 These financial institutions can be 
accountable institutions,304 supervisory bodies305 and/or reporting institutions.306 Accountable 
institutions are those institutions that are listed in Schedule 1 of FICA and include banks, attorneys, 
trust companies, estate agents, gambling companies, dealers in foreign exchange, moneylenders 
against securities and members of the stock exchange. The supervisory bodies as listed in Schedule 
2 of FICA include the Financial Services Board, the South African Reserve Bank, the Estate 
Agencies, and the Registrar of Companies. The reporting institutions as listed in Schedule 3 of FICA 
include car dealers and dealers in Kruger Rands. 
Chapter 3 of FICA imposes certain control measures to assist accountable institutions to 
combat money laundering and terrorism financing.307 One of the most effective ways is to go through 
a proper KYC/CDD process.  This is clearly recognised by FICA. Chapter 3, Part 1 deals with 
customer due diligence; Part 2 deals with the duty to keep records; Part 3 deals with the duty to 
report to the FIC; Part 4 deals with compliance issues; and Part 5 deals with referrals and 
supervision. 
  
3.3.2 The KYC/CDD from the perspective of FICA. 
The implementation of KYC/CDD, as required by law, is not an easy task and it poses a challenge for 
accountable institutions.308 It requires of accountable institutions to be able both to identify and to 
verify customers.  
Customer identification is no longer conducted in terms of Regulation 2 to 18 of FICA like 
before, as the new amendment to FICA moved from the rule-based approach to the risk-based 
approach.  The previous rule based approach in the form of regulations was proven to be 
unsatisfactory and the changes in the international approach to customer due diligence has forced 
South African government to adopt the new risk based approach.  
Customer identification is conducted in three levels.   The first level is where the prospective 
customer in person approaches a bank, the second is where someone on behalf of the prospective 
customer approaches the bank, and the last is where another person acting on behalf of the customer 
approaches the bank.  On all three levels, an accountable institution is mandated by the provisions of 
section 21(1) of FICA not to establish a business relationship or conclude a single transaction without 
having complied with the identification requirements.   
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Customer identification is the process whereby information is obtained from the customer for 
the purpose of identification. Before establishing a bank-customer relationship, a bank must identify 
the customer properly and must not get into any business relationship with an unidentified customer.  
This is confirmed clearly in the provisions of section 20A of FICA, which states that an accountable 
institution must not deal with anonymous customers or customers using a fictitious or false name.309  
The manner in which the accountable institution complies with section 20A in respect of business 
relationships and single transactions, both below and above the threshold, must be recorded in the 
institution’s Risk Management Compliance Programme (RMCP).310  Accountable institutions carry a 
risk when they transact with unknown customers or customers acting or using false names. The use 
of counterfeit documentation by money launderers in order to avoid detection is the biggest risk faced 
by accountable institutions and the RMCP must speak to how the accountable institution is going to 
mitigate the risk of use of fictitious names.  Accountable institutions must prevent anonymity by 
implementation of enhanced CDD measures.311   
The accountable institutions are required by the Act to establish and verify the identity of a 
prospective customer before conducting a single transaction or establishing a business relationship 
and in accordance with the accountable institution’s RMCP .312   
The use of the word “must” can also be understood to mean that banks have no discretion as 
to whether or not they want to carry out a CDD before a business relationship can be established.313  
The intention of the legislation is sufficiently stated in the preamble to the Act and the wording of 
section 21 of FICA as to impose the duty on accountable institutions to identify and verify their 
customers before establishing a business relationship. This means that the accountable institutions 
are therefore duty bound to carry out the customer identification and verification duties in terms of the 
provisions of section 21 of FICA.   
Accountable institutions are required by section 21 of FICA to establish the identification and 
verification of customers that are party to business relationship that were established before the 
amendment Act took effect and trace all accounts at the institution that are involved in the 
transactions concluded in the course of that relationship.314 
Accountable institutions are also required to ascertain from a prospective customer what will 
be the nature and intended purpose of the business relationship, and obtain information on how the 
business will be funded.315  The purpose of section 21A of FICA is to understand the nature of the 
customer and the envisaged business relationship between the accountable institution and the 
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customer.316 This understanding should give the accounting institution a clear opportunity to monitor 
the transactions of the prospective customer and eliminate the risk of money laundering and terrorism 
financing. 
Section 21B of FICA, as introduced by the amendments provides for additional customer due 
diligence to be conducted for legal persons,317 trust318 and partnerships. The accountable institutions 
are obliged, in relation to these customers, to determine the nature of their business, the ownership 
and control structure of the customer and who the beneficial owners of the customer are.319 Beneficial 
owners are the natural persons who independently or together with other persons, own the legal 
person or exercise effective control over the legal person.320  The discussion on beneficial ownership 
is expanded on below. 
Section 21B (2) of FICA further compels the accounting institution to identify and verify the 
beneficial owner by conducting due diligence on the natural persons who have control, whether 
individually or collectively, of the legal person.  If ownership interest does not indicate the beneficial 
owner, the accountable institution will have to establish who the natural person is that exercises 
control of the legal person through other means.321  The manner in which the accountable institution 
must deal with trusts and partnerships, is similar. 
Thus, accountable institutions are required to conduct due diligence on the members of a 
partnership by establishing the identification name of the partnership, the identi ty of every partner 
whether dormant or not, identity of all executives who exercise control, identity of all natural persons 
who represent the partnership in any form.322  In the case of a trust the name of the trust must be 
identified, the Master of the High Court where the trust was established, the identity of trustees and 
their agents, the beneficiaries and their representatives and the identities of all natural persons in 
whatever capacity they are involved in the trust.323 
The law requires that the accountable institution conduct on-going due diligence in respect of 
existing business relationship with customers.324 This calls for accountable institutions to monitor the 
activities and transactions of their customers in dealing with how they handle their accounts. 
Accountable institutions must develop a document, in the form of the RMCP, that will guide how they 
will monitor the activities of their customers, the origin of funds into their accounts and unusual 
transactions.  The information kept must be up to date. The frequency and intensity of ongoing due 
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diligence in respect of a business relationship must be determined on the basis of the accountable 
institution’s understanding of risks associated with the relationship and must be included in its RMCP 
- it must set out how the ongoing due diligence will be conducted.325  
Financial institutions should be required to ensure that documents, data or information 
collected under the CDD process are updated and are relevant by undertaking reviews of existing 
records, particularly for higher-risk categories of customers.326 If the accountable institution, after 
entering into a business relationship with a customer, doubts the accuracy of the information given to 
it, the accountable institution must repeat all the steps as stated in section 21 and section 21B of 
FICA and in line with the RMCP.327 
If an accountable institution is unable to conduct customer due diligence properly due to any 
reason, it may not establish a business relationship with that customer, nor conclude a transaction 
with that customer and must terminate any existing business relationship with the customer. 328 The 
accountable institution need not to be subjective when considering its inability to conduct customer 
due diligence but should objectively consider the prevailing circumstance that prevents the customer 
due diligence process and consider reporting the customer in terms of section 29 of FICA. 329 
The term “prominent influential person” (PIP) applies to persons who perform important public 
functions for a state.  A bank should conduct proper due diligence on both a PIP and the persons 
acting on his/her behalf. KYC principles must be applied to PIPs, their family members330 and close 
associates.331  
There is always a danger that PIPs may abuse their positions of power for their own 
enrichment through the receipt of bribes, corruption and embezzlement.  A bank that concludes a 
transaction with a PIP must always guard against the possibility of it being used as a laundry machine 
or a conduit for the proceeds of bribery, corruption and funds stolen from the public purse. 332 
As it is, FICA does not prohibit banks from dealing with PIPs. One can assume that by 
subjecting PIPs to enhanced due diligence, a bank runs the risk of putting itself on a collision course 
with the government.  As rulers of the day, PIPs from the ruling party may feel that they are being 
undermined by being subjected to thorough questioning from bank officials before an account can be 
opened for them. The questioning may offend the PIP with the result that the business stream flowing 
from the government to the bank may suddenly dry up.  If, for instance, the President of the Republic 
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326 FATF (n 82). 
327 s 21D of FICA. 
328 s 21E of FICA. 
329 FIC (n 159) par 135-136. 
330 Family members include close family members such as spouses, children, parents and siblings and may also include 
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331 FIC Guidance for Banks on Customer Identification and Verification and Related Matters par 25 
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were to walk into the bank and ask to open a bank account, senior management333 would attend to 
him and try as hard as possible to make the experience painless and less time consuming. It is my 
submission that no bank in its right mind will not want to have the President of the Repub lic as a 
client. There are immense business opportunities in having the President, or any PIP for that matter, 
as a client.  That is the challenge facing accountable institutions.  At times the bank will have to 
choose between a rock - pleasing a PIP by not asking intrusive questions - and a hard place - 
complying with the law and subjecting a PIP to enhanced due diligence in terms of FICA 
requirements.  The bank is required to perform a delicate balancing act by ensuring that it does not 
offend its potential customers and at the same time complies with the relevant legislation. When all is 
said and done, due diligence for PIPs must be performed without fear or favour. 
Prominent influential persons are people who hold positions of trust and authority in public 
offices and are divided into two categories namely domestic prominent influential persons 334 and 
foreign prominent public officials.335 The accountable institution, when dealing with such persons and 
their immediate families and associates, must first categorise them in terms of risk assessment. 
Generally, the prominent domestic influential person is of low risk compared to the prominent foreign 
influential official and the accountable institution must consider each case on its own merits .336 
When dealing with foreign prominent influential officials, the accountable institution must 
consider using senior management of the institution to approve or disapprove any business 
relationship with such people.  The decision to approve or reject the business relationship with such 
persons should be based on objective risk assessment in accordance with the RMCP.337 Section 21F 
of FICA provides for the manner in which accountable institutions should deal with foreign prominent 
influential officials. 
Section 21G of FICA deals specifically with domestic prominent influential persons and 
provides that since domestic prominent influential persons are known, the apparatus of risk 
assessment should be those of low risk unless proven otherwise.  By virtue of their positions, the 
prominent influential persons have unrestricted access to the public purse and financial arrangements 
such as budgets, bank accounts of state departments, publicly controlled companies and contracts.  
Their proximity to the public purse and financial arrangements render them prune to kickbacks, 
bribery and corruption and therefore accountable institutions must establish the origin or source of 
funds in their accounts.338 
The accountable institutions are required by FICA to establish and verify the identities of 
persons associated with prominent influential persons.339 These could be members of the immediate 
                                                          
333 FATF (n 82). 
334 s 1 of FICA defines domestic prominent influential person as meaning a person referred to in Schedule 3A of FICA. 
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336 FIC (n 159) par 139. 
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families including spouses, children, parents, siblings, and close associates who could be anyone 
associated with the prominent person either socially or professionally.340 
 
3.3.3 Specific identification and verification issues. 
Accountable institutions must conduct specific identification and verification in order to fulfil the 
provisions of section 21 of FICA.  However, large parts of the MLTFC Regulations have been 
repealed.  Accountable institutions must now choose the type of information by means of which they 
will identify and verify the identities of their customers through a rigorous risk assessment process 
that is detailed in its RMCP.341  Any reference to the regulations below is made to illustrate how 
accountable institutions were to conduct the CIV process before the 2017 amendments.  
 
3.3.3.1 Natural persons: Citizens and residents. 
The introduction of section 42 by the amendment of FICA saw the rule-based approach being 
replaced by a risk-based approach through the RMCP. Accountable institutions are required to 
develop a comprehensive risk management and compliance programme, which will table a map on 
how the institution will curb risk when identifying and verifying prospective and existing customers.342 
The RMCP should prescribe the information that must be established in respect of all natural 
persons who are citizens of or resident in the Republic of South Africa. The person’s full names, date 
of birth, identity number, income tax registration number (if such a number has been issued to that 
person) and the residential address must be established.343  Having obtained this information, a bank 
must take a further step and verify the information that was obtained during this first stage. It is never 
enough only to obtain the prescribed particulars relating to the identity of a client.  A bank must verify 
the full names, date of birth and identity number of a natural person by comparing these particulars 
with an identification document of that person.  If that person, for any reason that is acceptable to the 
bank, is unable to produce an identification document, another acceptable document issued to that 
person by the authorities can be used.  This should be done by taking into account any guidance 
notes concerning the verification of identities of customers used by that accountable institution.  That 
document must bear a photograph of that person, that person’s full names or initials and surname, 
that person’s date of birth, and that person’s identity number.344 
The reasons for the failure to produce an identification document must be noted and recorded 
by the bank, together with the details of the staff member who recorded the information.345 Only in 
exceptional cases will a valid South African driver’s licence or any other document issued to the 
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341 FIC (n 159) par 84. 
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customer be accepted as a valid form of alternative verification.346  According to the FIC Guidance for 
Accountable Institutions on Client Identification and Verification and Related Matters,347 an 
accountable institution must verify the residential address by comparing these details with information 
that can reasonably be expected to achieve such verification and is obtained by reasonably practical 
means, taking into consideration any applicable guidance notes concerning the verification of 
identities. This can be achieved by asking the client to provide the proof of address. 348 
According to the FIC, accountable institutions have been battling with the question what 
process to follow and which types of documentation to accept to verify the residential address of a 
client, which resulted in the frustration of the verification process. The FIC accordingly took steps to 
mitigate this situation by providing guidance regarding which documents qualify for verification. 
Guidance Note 3A includes a list of examples of documentation that may be used to verify the 
residential address of a natural person that is not exhaustive.  Documents that may be used as proof 
of the residential address of a person include, inter alia, the following: 
•  a utility bill; 
•  a recent lease or rental agreement; 
•  a municipal rates and taxes statement; 
•  a telephone or cellular account; 
•  a valid television licence; 
 
The residential address of a prospective customer must be verified by comparing these particulars 
with information that can reasonably be expected to achieve such verification and is obtained by 
reasonably practical means, taking into account any guidance notes concerning the verification of 
identities that may apply to that institution.349 The ability of accountable institutions to verify the 
identity of prospective customers is a necessary condition for financial inclusion. 350  Without verifiable 
identities, such institutions cannot adhere to KYC requirements as stipulated in AML/CFT regulation.  
The safest way for the bank to verify the address of a client is for an employee/agent of the bank to 
visit the residential address of the client to verify if indeed the client resides at the stated address or 
the introduction of innovative methods to improve financial inclusion for those who have no fixed 
addresses.  This proves to be very time consuming and needs more resources for the accountable 
institution to perform, I submit. 
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When someone is acting on behalf of the other person, proper verification of that person needs to 
be performed.351 The accountable institution must confirm authority to represent the customer by 
requesting the power of attorney, mandate, resolution if representing a company or a court order 
authorising the person to conduct business on behalf of the other person. 352 
 
3.3.3.2 Natural persons: Foreign nationals. 
The identification requirements are the same for foreign nationals as for South African citizens and 
residents except that instead of producing an identity document bearing his/her identity number, a 
foreign national will identify himself/herself with a passport or asylum papers and his/her nationality 
must be ascertained.353 
The foreign national must provide his/her full names and, by necessary implication, these will 
be the names appearing on his/her passport. In the event that the passport contains initials, the 
foreign national must provide his/her full names over and above the initials on his passport. 354 The 
passport must be valid. An expired passport is of no use, as its validity has ended and its identifying 
abilities have ceased to function.   As a measure of extra caution, the bank must ask for a certified 
copy of the passport which must be certified by the relevant embassy of the fore ign national in order 
to make sure that the copy supplied is the actual copy of the original passport issued by that country 
and the embassy is in the position to know the originality of a passport issued in their country.355  
The foreign national must provide his/her fixed place of residence.356 The foreign national must 
also provide his/her contact particulars.357 Ordinarily, this will be the postal address, e-mail address, 
telephone number and mobile phone number.358 A bank must verify the particulars obtained in respect 
of a natural person who is not a citizen of the Republic and not resident in the Republic, by comparing 
these particulars with an identification document of that person.  Information obtained regarding tax 
numbers must be verified by the particulars contained therein with a document issued by the South 
African Revenue Services bearing such a number.359  It is important that verification be done using 
information obtained from a reliable and independent third-party source and, as far as possible, the 
original source of the information.360  These sources can be the offices of the government where the 
original document was issued. 
Guidance Note 3A provides further elucidation on the steps that a bank must undertake to verify 
the identity of a foreign national. When a bank requires further verification of the identity of a foreign 
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national, the bank may obtain such information by requesting a letter of confirmation from a person in 
authority, for example from the relevant embassy, that confirms the authenticity of that person’s 
passport.361 
 
3.3.3.3 Legal persons and beneficial ownership. 
A legal person is defined in FICA362 as any person, other than a natural person, that establishes a 
business relationship or enters into a single transaction with an accountable institution and includes a 
person incorporated as a company, close corporation, foreign company or any other form of corporate 
arrangement or association but excludes a trust, partnership or sole proprietor .363  In transacting with 
the said legal persons, an accountable institution must obtain the following information from the 
natural person who acts or purports to act on behalf of it whether it is establishing a business 
relationship or concluding a single transaction: 
(i) The registered name of the close corporation or company;  
(ii) The registration number under which the close corporation or company is incorporated;   
(iii)  The registered address of the close corporation or company.364 
 
Over and above the normal due diligence exercised by the accountable institution, it is required, in 
terms of section 21B of FICA, to go further by applying additional due diligence measures to establish 
the following :-365 
• The nature of the client’s business; 
• The ownership and control of the client; and 
• The beneficial ownership of the client.366 
 
As mentioned above, beneficial ownership refers to the control stake of a natural persons in any legal 
entity and it is required of accountable institutions to conduct proper due diligence of any legal person 
in order to identify the beneficial owner.367 
Beneficial ownership has been the subject of discussion in many international bodies that deal 
with the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.  The FATF issued a guidance note on 
how member countries should approach the issue of beneficial ownership. 368 The beneficial owner is 
defined as the natural person who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the natural person 
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on whose behalf a transaction is being concluded and includes any person who exercises ultimate 
effective control over the legal person or arrangements.369 
The definition above extends beyond legal ownership and control and consider the notion of 
actual ownership and control by focusing on the natural person who actually owns and issues 
instructions or make decisions on behalf of the legal person.370  The definition also looks at the legal 
arrangement where the natural person becomes the beneficiary at the end of the chain, who 
ultimately owns the legal arrangement and who exercises ultimate effective control over the legal 
arrangement.371 
Effectively this means that beneficial ownership can be hidden using shell companies, 
complex ownership and control structures, bearer of shares and share warrants, use of legal persons 
as directors, trusts and many other ways or legal arrangements.372 
The enactment of the 2017 FIC Amendment Act saw the recognition of the concept of the 
beneficial ownership and the requirement for disclosure of beneficial ownership information. 373 
Professor Hugo and Spruyt write that the percentage of shareholding with voting rights is a good 
indicator of control. In this regard, the centre takes the view that 25% or more of the shares with 
voting rights is usually sufficient to exercise control. If such direct ownership interests do not indicate 
a clear beneficial owner, the accountable institution must resort to other means to determine 
beneficial ownership.  If no natural person can be identified who exercises control through such other 
means, the accountable institution "must determine who the natural person is who exercises control 
over the management of the legal person, including in the capacity of an executive officer, 
nonexecutive officer, nonexecutive director, independent nonexecutive director, director or 
manager”.374 
A natural person must necessarily act on behalf of a juristic person. The identity of such 
natural person or persons must be established and verified, as well as his/her authority to act for and 
on behalf of the juristic person.375  
The information must be verified by examining the information of the person and establishing 
whether that information, prima facie, provides proof of the necessary authorisation. The person 
acting on behalf of another may provide the following documents to confirm his authority to act on 
behalf of another person, whether natural or juristic, and the particulars of the instructing party 
authorising the third party to establish the relationship:376  
(1)  power of attorney;  
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(2)  mandate;  
(3)  resolution duly executed by authorised signatories; or  
(4)  a court order authorising the third party to conduct business on behalf of another 
person. 
 
3.3.3.4 Partnerships. 
A partnership is a business enterprise with no legal entity status and therefore is different from 
other legal persons.  When a partnership wishes to establish a business relationship with the 
accountable institution, the accountable institution must act in accordance with its RMCP and in 
accordance with section 21 of FICA and go ahead to establish and verify the identities of each 
partner, whether dormant or active.377 In identifying and verifying clients who are in a partnership, the 
accountable institution must, over and above the requirements of section 21 and 21A of FICA, 
establish the identify and verify the identity of each and every partner in a partnership, as a 
partnership does not have legal personality. It must also determine who is in executive control of the 
partnership.378 
 
3.3.3.5 Trusts. 
The identification and verification of a Trust requires the accountable institutions to establish the 
identity of the Trust through a trust deed, the office of the Master of the Court where the trust was 
opened, the trustees and their representatives, the beneficiaries and their representatives and the 
kind of trust.379  Anyone who represent the trust and wishes to open a business relationship with the 
accountable institution must provide the trust deed or founding affidavit, letter of authority from the 
Master’s office, trustee resolution to act and personal details of all trustees, beneficiar ies and 
founder.380 The accountable institution must establish the identity of the trust founder, the trustees 
and the beneficiaries, by establishing the names and identity numbers of all natural persons involved 
in the trust.381 All natural persons must be verified in accordance with the RMCP and the guidance 
notes issued by the FIC.  
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4.  Conclusion. 
In conclusion, the common law position before the Indac Electronics case favoured the banker.  
Before the Indac Electronics judgment, the Yorkshire Insurance case was the authority.  The ruling in 
the Yorkshire case was that the banker is not delictually liable for the lost or stolen cheque to the true 
owner of cheque.  The courts were highly influenced by English law, in the main.  This ruling was 
confirmed by the subsequent case of Atkinson Oates Motors Ltd v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd which set 
a collision course between commentators and courts.  They were divided on whether the courts 
interpret or developed the law correctly with regard to the delictual liability of banker to the true owner 
of a stolen or lost cheque.  The Indac Electronics case took a different view from the Yorkshire 
Insurance judgment.  The Indac Electronics case placed liability for lost or stolen cheque on the 
collecting banker, from where the law developed, in the KwaMashu case, to place an obligation on a 
bank to conduct proper due diligence when opening an account to avoid potential delictual liability.  A 
number of academics also supported this development.   
The duty of banker to identify and verify the identity of a customer was introduced by statute to 
South Africa through the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001.  Because South Africa is a 
member of various financial international organisation like the FATF, the BCBS and other there was a 
need to enact legislation in line with the international standards.  This piece of legislation (FICA) is 
one of the most important pieces of legislation used to fight financial crime in South Africa. FICA 
established the Financial Intelligence Centre, a regulatory body tasked to monitor compliance with the 
Act.  As stated above, all accountable institutions and reporting institutions are obliged to comply with 
the requirements of the Act by identifying and verifying anyone wishing to have a business 
relationship with an accountable institution and reporting any suspicious transactions to the FIC. The 
information gathered by the FIC is used to combat money laundering, and the financing of terrorism, 
and used as intelligence for future law enforcement activities. 
The obligations created by FICA are enforceable by the FIC through compliance checks, 
inspections and investigations. FICA also requires other agencies to act against money laundering 
and financing of terrorism. These agencies include the South African Revenue Services, which also 
benefits through combating transfer pricing and tax evasion, the South African Police Service that has 
a constitutional mandate to investigate all reported crimes, and the Asset Forfeiture Unit which deals 
with forfeiture of property gained through proceeds of crime.   
As a subject of discussion in this dissertation, it is clear that FICA requires banks and other 
accountable institutions to comply with the requirements of FICA, which amongst other things, is to 
identify and verify its customers.382 Failure by any of the accountable institutions and reporting 
institutions to comply with the provisions of FICA will lead to penalties and even in some instances 
criminal prosecution. The requirement to identify and verify customers by banks is not only a FICA 
requirement but also a requirement of international regulatory organisations operating in the banking 
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sector. This includes the FATF, which produces policies to be followed by member states on how to 
identify and verify customers by banks, including risk management. 
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